"Asset Shortage" Seems To Have Never Left The Field Of "Money" Has Become The Biggest Problem.

As time goes by, the long end yield has returned to the level of eight years ago, but the benchmark interest rate is much higher than that of that year. Under the guidance of the "2.25% month seven day reverse repo rate" (recently increased by 2.40% fourteen days), we see that the term spreads have been squeezed to the extreme. In the past two years, with the default of the bond market and the fact that many of the default events are still unsettled, the logic of "money more" has pushed the credit spreads to below the historical average.

What is even more surprising is that the short-term liabilities cost of banks and insurance still stays above 4% in the medium term and high level credit debt yields generally below 3.50%.

The author thinks that this period mismatch.

The situation of mismatch is not sustainable for a long time.

We have to admit that there is indeed overcrowding in the current bond market.

Since June,

Ushered in another small climax during the year.

The reason for this is that, from a macro perspective, investors are pessimistic about the economic outlook, especially the economic and financial data released in early July in August. The industrial added value continues to descend. Social integration and credit are much lower than expected. It also gives the sellers' analysts and buyers of the bond market a shot in the arm and yields further downwards. From a micro level, the "shortage of assets" has never left the market since the second half of last year.

In the 8 years of the author's employment, the long end interest rate has also seen such a low period.

In the four quarter of 2008, international

The domestic monetary policy relaxed significantly, when the interbank overnight lending rate was less than 1%, which was only slightly higher than the over storage rate.

Banks have accumulated large amounts of funds and the rate of bad debts is relatively low.

Inter bank tickets, short melt market just started, more than 80% of the issuer is the AAA level state-owned enterprises, the debt market default is not to talk about.

What will happen in the future? Perhaps we are more concerned about this problem.

Macroscopically speaking, China's economy has entered a period of pformation and shift.

In short, after the reform and opening up, China's rapid economic growth has been maintained for nearly 30 years. After that, we may have to adapt to the "new normal", that is, a medium speed or a medium speed growth period.

From an economic point of view, we need to find a new "potential output" level.

In the past, our potential output was constant, and the actual output around the fluctuation of potential output also formed the so-called economic cycle, so we had our "Merrill Lynch Investment clock".

With the aging of the population, the reduction of capital efficiency and the reduction of total factor productivity, the potential output of the economy is declining, and it is no longer a constant level.

With the decline of actual output and potential output, the economy continuously seeks for a new equilibrium position, and the Merrill clock on investment becomes a "Merrill electric fan".

The logic of future money has not changed, and the stalemate of real output and potential output will continue. Therefore, asset rotation will continue, and volatility may be bigger, and future investment will become more and more difficult.

But it is certain that we will continue for a considerable period of time in a low interest rate and low return environment.

The bond market comes from interest rates and credit shocks.

Only by lowering the expected revenue and leveling the mind, can we observe the market more objectively and seek more stable return on investment for investors.