Modern Property Rights Theory And Its Enlightenment To Accounting

The essence of "abstract" is the behavior relationship or institutional arrangement between people in the use of scarce goods and others.

Modern property rights theory holds that economics is essentially the study of the property rights of scarce resources. Therefore, all the problems of economics can be analyzed in the framework of property rights theory.

Although the clear definition of property rights is the premise of paction, but because paction costs are positive, property rights are not fully defined. Therefore, free trade and contractual relationship are essentially a process of redefining property rights through pricing, and this process is also a process of resource allocation to better convergence.

The undefined property rights are placed in the public domain as public wealth, freely grabbed by the parties to the paction, and under the constraint of each one, the equilibrium of property rights game is finally achieved.

Finally, from the perspective of the theory of property rights, I have discussed the development and influence of accounting.

It is a tradition of classical political economics, especially the analysis of Marx's political economy.

However, since the beginning of the marginal revolution in the late nineteenth Century, in the process of trying to make it more like a natural science that can be handled by a rigorous mathematical tool, property rights and its institutional factors have disappeared from the perspective of economic analysis.

This point is embodied in the neoclassical general equilibrium theory system.

Because the theory assumes that the paction cost is zero and the information is complete, the pursuit of maximized trading behavior by the economic people can make the allocation of resources reach Pareto's best place, and all property rights, institutions, organizations and even the state are redundant.

Although there is the theory of enterprise and externality in neoclassical economics, enterprises are only a black box of input and output, so the theory of enterprises is at best a production function theory, unable to explain the complex contractual relationship and efficiency of enterprises, while its external view is obstinately immersed in the "dogma of Pigou", ignoring the externality and the nature of property rights.

American economist Ronald.

Kos launched an attack on two aspects of neoclassicism in two classic papers in 1937 and 1960.

By introducing the concept of paction cost, he successfully incorporated property rights and institutional factors into the analytical framework of economics, thus promoting the emergence and development of modern property economics, new institutional economics and modern enterprise theory.

In the view of modern property rights theory, paction cost is not only positive but also very large in the real economic world, so property right is no longer irrelevant, but a very important factor that affects the efficiency of economic organization and resource allocation and economic growth.

Thanks to the efforts of property rights economists, modern property economics has shown a better "performance" in explaining many important issues, such as incentives for individuals, substitution of enterprises and markets, changes in enterprise systems, and economic development. It has not only made it a significant learning in modern economics, but also has an important impact on the development of economics and management related disciplines.

We introduce the theory of modern property right here to see whether the analysis method of property right theory can enlighten the research of accounting.

Therefore, this article starts from the analysis of the concept of property rights, starting from the core topic of economics, namely the efficiency of resource allocation, introduces the origin and changes of property rights and the theory of property rights paction. On this basis, it tries to make a theoretical generalization of the basic analysis method of modern property rights theory, and finally discusses some immature ideas on the application of modern property rights theory and its basic analysis methods in accounting.

The definition and function of property rights: (1) the definition of property rights, property rights, is said to be a more confusing concept in the economic world. Different scholars give different meanings from different angles.

Even in the works of modern property economics, their definitions are different.

Next we will draw some authoritative definitions of property rights.

Allchin, a famous property right economist, defines the property right as a "right to choose a variety of economic articles through social compulsion" in the new lexicon economic dictionary.

Law enforcement can also be carried out by the prevailing ethical norms or customs; economic goods refer to anything that can bring human utility or satisfaction; if in a narrow sense, property is only tangible external scarcity, and broadly speaking, it can also include all intangible scarcity, such as goodwill, human resources and so on. Rights are plural here, including not only the right to use, pfer, income, and so on, but also in every category of rights, property owners under social compulsion also have various options, such as the right to pfer, he has the right to choose the way of market auction to pfer property, and the right to choose the way to pfer his property. (Eatwell, et al., 1987, Chinese plation (the same below), 1101st pages) here, social coercion can be made by the state.

In the classic thesis of modern property rights theory, the definition of property rights is the right of property owners, that is, what can be done and what can not be done.

He said, "we say that someone owns the land and takes it as a factor of production, but what the landowners actually have is the right to carry out certain actions.

The power of land owners is not unlimited.

It is impossible for him to move the land to other places by digging, though he may prevent someone from using his land, but otherwise it is not necessarily the case.

(Kos, 1960, Chinese plation (the same below), 123rd pages) Kos here is defined from the point of view of externality, so as to illustrate that the cost of exercising a right (using a factor of production) is the loss of the exercise of the right to make others suffer - not crossing, parking, building, enjoying the scenery, enjoying tranquility and breathing fresh air.

(Coase, 1960, 123rd pages), so in Coase's view, externality is essentially a property right problem.

Although Demsetz, another property rights economist, defined property rights from the perspective of externalities, he emphasized the function and role of property rights.

He said: "property right is a social tool, and its importance comes from the fact that property rights help people form expectations that they can reasonably hold when dealing with others.

This expectation is expressed through laws, customs and social morality.

Therefore, "property rights stipulate specifically how to benefit people, how to make them impaired, and who must pay for the adjustment of people's behavior."

(Demsetz, 1988, Chinese plation (the same page) 129th pages) so property right here is a system arrangement to regulate people's behavior and internalize externalities.

When Faye Lui Boateng and Pejewitsy summarized the theory of modern property rights, they defined a definition that can be recognized by most people, that is, "property right is not the relationship between people and objects, but the behavior relationship between people that is recognized by the existence of things and their use."

It is a series of economic and social relations used to determine the status of each person relative to scarce resources. "

(1972, Chinese plation (the same below), 204th pages) they believe that this definition basically conforms to the Rome law, the common law and the existing laws, as well as the understanding of property rights in Marx economics and modern economics.

Although the above definitions of property rights are different, we believe that the modern property rights economics has the following common understanding of the concept of property rights: first, property rights are no longer simply viewed as the relationship between human beings and the external scarcity, but as the behavior relationship between people in the use of this scarce substance and others.

As Demsetz said, "in Robinson.

In the world of Mr. So, property rights are useless.

(Demsetz, 1988, 129th pages) this understanding is consistent with Marx's economics in emphasizing the nature of ownership of production or ownership.

Second, property rights are not just ownership, but a group of rights bundles, which include not only the various rights that the main body of property rights can exercise, but also the rights that can not be exercised.

As Kos said, "the system of unlimited power to individuals is actually a system without power."

(Coase, 1960, 204th page) third, property rights, as an artificial social tool or institutional arrangement, must be enforced by the society in the process of coordinating and regulating people's fight for scarce resources. Otherwise, property right is a mere scrap of paper and meaningless.

I think these three points of view are the definition of the basic nature of the concept of property right, and all other differences are mainly from the perspective of research.

(two) property rights and paction costs, when it comes to property rights, inevitably involves the concept of paction costs.

Niehans sees paction costs as a result of the pfer of property rights in the new lexicon Dictionary of economics, that is, the dispersion and paction of property rights can lead to the existence of paction costs (1987, 730th pages).

That is to say, although there is a production cost in a human world, there is no paction and no paction cost because there is no property right.

From this perspective, paction costs arise from paction frictions between property owners.

It is in this sense that Stiegler and Williamson both likened the paction cost to the frictional force in physics.

We know that there is no paction cost in the traditional neoclassical economics. In 1937, Kos first introduced the paction cost factor into the analytical framework of economics. After that, people used the paction cost analysis method to promote many new developments in economics.

However, there is no consensus on paction costs.

In the classic paction cost paper, Kos summarizes paction costs mainly as the cost of finding relative prices and the cost of signing contracts.

(Coase, 1937, Chinese Version (the same below), sixth pages), but later some economists tend to have a broader understanding of paction costs, and consider paction costs as the cost of all system operations, all costs other than production costs.

I personally think that if we understand this, paction cost is a very bad definition.

Therefore, I agree with Mathews's definition of paction cost.

In his view, paction cost is the cost of an advance contract to reach a (arranging) contract and the cost of subsequent supervision (Monioring) and Implementation (enforcing) of the contract (Matthews, 1986).

From this definition, paction costs can be subdivided into the following six aspects of expenditure (Thrainn, 1990, pp.5): (1) searching for information about price distribution, product quality and labor input; (2) bargaining for buyers and sellers in order to find favorable prices or trading positions; (3) expenditure in the signing process; (4) supervising the execution of contracts to understand whether the other party complies with the terms of the contract; (5) when the other party discovers a breach of contract, the enforcement of the contract is executed and the losses are discovered; (6) protection of property rights to prevent third infringes.

Although the paction cost originates from the property right paction, the different arrangements of the property right system directly affect the paction cost.

Kos's theorem points out that when the paction is zero, any arrangement of property rights is indifferent; however, when paction costs are positive, property rights play a vital role in the efficiency of resource allocation.

Therefore, in the very short term, Zhang's view of the different arrangements of property rights and the size of paction costs is a key factor determining the economic growth of a country.

Three types of property rights are generally classified into two categories: private property rights and common property rights.

Private property right refers to the exclusive right that property rights are fully defined to individuals, that is, individuals have the exclusive right to choose multiple uses of economic goods, that is, they are completely controlled by individual will.

However, private property rights do not mean that all kinds of rights can never be fully grasped in the hands of individuals. That is to say, private property rights are divisibility, separability and pferability. It is precisely because of this characteristic that the private property rights system has promoted the development of market economy.

The common property right or public property right refers to the definition of the right of property to the public, that is, no one will exercise the same right when he exercises his right to choose a right of public resources.

For example, the right way to fish in the open sea is exactly the same as that of others.

An important difference between the pure property right and the private property is that the common property is not exclusive, and anyone can