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Liu Haiying: The Next Ten Years Of China's Economy

2012/12/24 10:17:00 21

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China's Economy Economic Policy Macro Economy

in the next ten years, how much will the growth rate of "a href=" http://sjfzxm.com/news/index_cj.as "China's economy < /a" be? This is not only a theoretical issue, but also an important policy issue. Different answers to this question may determine what economic and social policies are appropriate. Based on the analysis framework of the development mechanism and the comparative study of Japan, Korea and Brazil, our analysis shows that the average growth rate of China in the next 10 years will be reduced to 5% to 6%. This estimate is lower than Professor Yifu Lin's expectations, but higher than Professor Pettis's estimate of Peking University. 
 in other words, compared with the average growth rate of 10.5% over the past 2001~2010 years and ten years, the Chinese economy may have to suffer a painful growth rate. In essence, this is the bitter fruit of China's economic enjoyment of the past ten years, such as the reform dividend, demographic dividend and globalization dividend, which have lagged behind in the reform of the system. 
 but China is not the first country to experience this change. The economic development history of Korea is a precedent, showing a similar dynamic mechanism and time frame for the next step of growth. 
 as the World Bank Research Institute found, every economy that has achieved economic overtaking performance is the implementer of the export oriented economic policy, which implies that exports have the importance of surpassing the surface in the process of economic development. According to our previous discussion, the whole economy can be divided into two sectors: the export sector and the non export sector. The export department directly connects to the global production chain, and has the minimum radius for learning and introducing advanced production technology and economic process, and the advantage of late development can be best utilized. In this way, the export sector has the fastest pace of development. The technological progress and economic process improvement achieved by the export sector first spill over to the domestic supporting departments serving them, and spillover through the latter to second levels of supporting sectors. Under this ripple effect, the overall economic and technological level is rising rapidly, and the production possibilities frontier of the economy expands. 
Technological progress in the process of "P > is dependent on investment and solidified in the production process. The contribution of investment reflected in data to growth is, in fact, a measure of the contribution of technological progress. 
 take Korea as an example. Successful economic catching up process often goes through three stages: /p >
 the first stage of reform and construction. To catch up with the economy, by definition, it is often backward, < a > agricultural economy < /a >. After President Pu Zhengxi took office, he made ambitious economic plans, supported private enterprises through indirect financing by the government's compulsive force, carried out a lot of infrastructure construction in the country, and strengthened infrastructure construction such as transportation, post and telecommunications, electricity, ports and other infrastructure projects, and completed large-scale projects such as Seoul Busan expressway, central line and other electrified railways. Because these projects are embedded in modern technology, with proven technology and economic rationality, their completion has effectively promoted the economic and technological level of Korea and laid a good foundation for the Korean economy to take off. This stage lasted until 1972, and investment contribution became the main force of economic growth. 
 second stages, export pulling stage. South Korea has always adhered to the export oriented economic policy with private enterprises as its main body. Its exports grew at an average annual rate of nearly 40%. With the increasing proportion of export sectors, export contributions overwhelmed the contribution of capital formation after 1972 and became the main driving force for economic growth. In 70s, exports accounted for 76% of the economic growth rate, and in 80s it was still 56%. 
 third stage, leveraged development stage. After 1989, the export speed of South Korea slowed down, and the new government was still striving for growth. It relied on the close relationship between the government and the financial industry and chaebol, and relied on huge fixed investment to maintain the rapid growth of the economy. At this stage, the contribution of capital formation exceeds the export contribution, and the cost is a straight climb of excess capacity and debt ratio. Under the pressure of excessive excess capacity, the crisis broke out in 1997, and the contribution of capital formation plummeted, and the economic growth was also running down the stage. 
 Japan has gone through three similar stages. Among them, after the 1972 economic crisis, the Japanese government could not tolerate the decline of economic growth and implemented the Keynes doctrine. However, its huge investment did not reverse the downward trend of Japan's economic growth. Instead, it increased the excess capacity and the debt burden, and eventually led to the total collapse of 1989 and the subsequent "lost 20 years". 
The failure of Brazil stems from the second stage. In 60s, when the Brazil military government came into power, it implemented similar policies with President Pu Zhengxi. The major difference was that most of its economic plans were completed by state-run enterprises, which led to Brazil's economy never entering the second stage successfully. After the end of the high-speed growth of investment driven in 60s, Brazil will rely on export contribution to increase its growth in the future. Instead, it will suffer from the huge ineffective investment, the government deficit, the debt crisis and the vicious inflation, and the economic development will be frustrated. 
 China's economic take-off has gone through a similar process with Korea. The reform and opening up in 80s has greatly improved the efficiency of resource allocation in China's economy. While huge investment has become the main driving force for economic growth, excess capacity has dropped from 20% to a single digit level. After the financial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997, China's economy was affected, and its contribution to capital formation rose sharply, driving economic growth. The difference was that the surplus capacity began to rise steadily. After China's accession to the WTO in 2002, China's economy took off to the second stage, and its export contribution exceeded the contribution of capital formation. Unlike Korea, China has continued to maintain a very high investment growth at this stage. As the investment and financing system reform is lagging behind, too many credit resources are flowing to inefficient local governments and state enterprises, and excess capacity continues to rise. In this way, China's second stage and the third stage are combined into one. The growth rate of 10.5% over the past 10 years is in fact a comprehensive consequence of rapid export growth and increased leverage. 
 this feature has laid a deep mark on the potential growth of China's economy in the future: when the export growth will inevitably decline, the contribution of capital formation will also drop under the pressure of excess capacity, leading to the downward trend of China's economic growth. 
 first look at the growth potential of the export sector. According to the world bank data, the last 20 years are the fastest 20 years of globalization. < a > export trade > /a > growth rate is 6.26%, higher than the actual GDP growth rate (2.7%), but lower than nominal GDP growth rate (8.3%). In the future, there is reason to believe that the speed of global exports may be lower than the speed of the past 20 years: first, the US led debt Gao Lei of developed countries is likely to be in a long way of deleveraging in the future, and the growth in demand for other products is slowing down. In fact, one of the reasons for the rapid growth of Global trade in the past 20 years is the demand bubble in developed countries. Secondly, this round of globalization has cut down many barriers to trade, and the obstacles that will be greatly reduced in the future will be reduced. Based on these considerations, about 5% to 5.5% may be an expected interval. 
It is hard to expect that it will continue to increase significantly from the perspective of P and its share of global exports from China. First, after a substantial appreciation, the undervaluation has narrowed to less than 100% from 1994. Secondly, China's low labor cost advantage is also rapidly dissipating as China's population dividend is exhausted and its consumption ratio rises. Third, significant changes have taken place in China's export structure. General trade accounts for more than processing trade. In order to achieve further global share under this product structure, China needs to challenge the developed countries such as Germany, Japan and other developed countries that occupy higher value chain status. Competitive advantage is no longer dependent on low cost labor force, but on technological level and innovation speed. China has no absolute advantage in this regard. Fourth, the rapid growth of China's exports over the past 20 years is related to the transfer of the global manufacturing industry chain to China, which is dominated by multinational corporations. In the future, this transfer speed is bound to decline. 
In the history of P, Japan's exports accounted for 8.8% of the world's exports, and then began to decline. By 2011, the proportion of China's exports to global exports has reached 10.4%, and there is little room for further growth. 
 combined with the decline of Global trade growth and the peak share of China's share, we expect that the speed of China's exports will be about 6% to 8% in the next 10 years. This rate is still quite high, but it is not the same as the 21.3% we have achieved in the past 10 years. 
 look at the non export sector. As mentioned earlier, the expansion speed of the production possibilities frontier of the non export sector depends on two components: endogenous speed and the spillover effect of technological progress in the export sector. In terms of the spillover effect of technological progress in the export sector, it depends on the difference between the growth rate of the export sector and the endogenous growth rate, the proportion of the export sector, the growth rate of capital formation, the excess capacity and the spillover effect parameters. In terms of endogenous growth rate, it mainly depends on the advantage of late development and the reform of the resource allocation system. In the past 10 years, the average export sector accounted for about 31.7%, with an average speed of about 21.3%, contributing 10.5% of the economic growth rate. The average speed of the non export sector was about 5.5%, of which the spillover effect was 1.5%, and the endogenous speed was 4%. It should be noted that the endogenous speed of 4% is much lower than that of the previous 10 years and 8% in the last 10 years, reflecting the decline of China's backwardness and the negative impact of its lagging behind in reform. 
 based on this assumption, it is assumed that the export growth rate will be 8% in the next 10 years, accounting for 30% of the economic ratio, 3.8% of the endogenous speed and 30% of the average surplus capacity, and the economic growth rate will be about 5.4%. What needs to be explained is that, according to the development of Japan, Korea and other economies, the above assumptions can not be called overly pessimistic. 
To correctly judge the future growth potential, we can only calm down the gains and losses of the past 10 years, and draw the correct experience and lessons, so that we can calmly deal with the stormy waves that will come in the future, and we must not be careless.