Bosideng Down Jacket: "Hat Skill" Gorgeous Turn

Compared with shagang and other enterprises, Bosideng, also born in South of Jiangsu, seems to have a special liking for the red hat of the state.

The restructuring of the road twists and turns, and in 1997, after leaving the collective enterprise status, and actively sojourn in the state-owned listed company hualian holdings, until 2004 only completely pformed into private enterprises, the seemingly humble down jacket business to the extreme.

In this process, the path of development and evolution not only reflects the growth track of private enterprises under complex capital ecology, but also reflects Gao Dekang's skillful and skillful financial skills in the relationship between government and enterprises.

During the Hualian holding company, Bosideng's capital way was constantly twists and turns, A shares crashed, and H-shares lost.

Finally, because of the complete withdrawal of state shareholders, Bosideng completed its pformation to "pure private" enterprises, and its capital "story" was continued. After a series of complicated reorganizations, "pure private enterprises" re turned into foreign-funded enterprises. Bosideng successfully landed in Hongkong's capital market and raised huge sums of money as a red chip.

Although Bosideng has already been the leader of the domestic cold clothing industry, the Hongkong capital market in the subtropical climate is rather unresponsive, warm winter anticipation and seasonal risks of products, and other factors perplexing investors. Although there are frequent holdings of large shareholders and a company's record volume repo, it still can not avoid its stock price going down all the way, once reduced to "

In order to ease the seasonal risk of the company's products and activate the financing function, Bosideng, through clever trading structure design, was able to acquire the assets of the large shareholders' men's clothing at a high price.

Gao Dekang spent more than 30 years finishing the hat and caps of the Chinese top down, finishing the first strong brand of the Chinese down jacket, and exploring the twists and turns of the growth path of enterprises in different ways. This is a typical example of the development of China's private enterprises.

But in the new development strategy, how to turn the strong brand potential energy of Bosideng down jacket into the brand kinetic energy of each garment subdivision area and thus "step into many different rivers at the same time" will be a new challenge for Gao Dekang.

In July 16, 2010, Bosideng International Holdings Limited, the largest down garment producer listed on the Hongkong stock exchange, released the 2009/2010 financial year (April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010) annual report. During the reporting period, Bosideng achieved operating income of 5 billion 738 million yuan, an increase of 34.2% over the same period last year, a new record high.

Brand down clothing business income still contributed significantly, accounting for 81.7% of the group's revenue.

It is worth mentioning that this is the first year of Bosideng's brand pformation strategy from "single season clothing products" to "four seasons clothing products". The men's clothing business income for the first time appeared in the company's earnings report, contributing 402 million yuan, accounting for 7% of the total revenue.

Bosideng bought Jiangsu Bosideng Clothing Development Co., Ltd. (formerly known as Jiangsu KangBo Garments Co., Ltd.) in May 2009 for about 650 million yuan, and entered the field of men's wear.

In fact, since Bosideng's implementation of the brand pformation strategy of "four seasons clothing products", overseas investment banks have been quite positive. Goldman Sachs even reported in April 2010 that Bosideng menswear business can expand to Lining's sales scale in the next 2-3 years and raise its target price from HK $2 to HK $2.4 to HK $2.4.

And Bosideng's share price has also got rid of the declining trend of listing since the listing, and has entered the rising channel. It has won the market in a big way. In the closing price of HK $2.61 in August 18th, the market value of Bosideng exceeded 20 billion Hong Kong dollars, while Gao Dekang, the largest shareholder of the company, had a net worth of HK $13 billion 600 million in 5 billion 200 million shares.

Gao Dekang spent more than 30 years from a small tailor in a village to the chairman of the board of directors of a ten billion listed company.

At this time, Bosideng's largest shareholder, Hualian holdings, must be sorry: in June 2004, when Gao Dekang took over Bosideng's 48% stake in Hualian holdings, the market value of Bosideng was only 437 million yuan. After three years, Bosideng went public with a market value of HK $27 billion 300 million, and its value added was nearly 60 times.

All this has nothing to do with Hualian holdings, which has been struggling in the process of pformation.

As we all know, when Bosideng was founded by Gao Dekang, when did it become a subsidiary of Hualian holdings, why did it finally come back to Gao Dekang? What kind of setbacks have it gone through? What kind of capital operation process does Bosideng have in the process of pformation? To solve these doubts, we must start with Gao Dekang's founding of Bosideng.

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Born in South of Jiangsu mode

Public information shows that Gao Dekang was born in January 1952 in Changshu, Jiangsu, and is currently the chairman and President of Bosideng International Holdings Limited. She also serves as secretary of the Party branch of KangBo village, Changshou City, Jiangsu.

He is both a private entrepreneur and a grass-roots cadre. This identity is the legacy of the famous South of Jiangsu model in the early years.

The South of Jiangsu mode usually refers to the development path of Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou (and sometimes Nanjing and Zhenjiang) in Jiangsu province through the development of township enterprises, and the main characteristics are: farmers rely on their own strength to develop township enterprises; the ownership structure of township enterprises is mainly based on collective economy; township governments dominate the development of township enterprises.

Shagang, Hong Kong Group and Bosideng are typical representatives of South of Jiangsu model.

Under the South of Jiangsu mode, enterprises are usually born out of township collective enterprises and are closely related to the local government.

For example, Shagang Group, known as "flagship" of South of Jiangsu, was a collective enterprise before restructuring. Shen Wenrong, chairman of the Shagang Group, served as Deputy Secretary of the Zhangjiagang Municipal Committee. He was elected the nine NPC deputy and the sixteen largest representative of the CPC.

It is widely believed that in 2001, when Shagang was restructured, Shen Wenrong formally left the political arena and focused on the development of Shagang, marking the complete end of the traditional South of Jiangsu model, which was predominated by the government.

Compared with shagang, Bosideng, who also came from South of Jiangsu, seems to have a special liking for the state-owned red hat.

After many twists and turns of its restructuring, after its departure from the collective enterprise status in 1997, it actively moved to the state owned listed company until 2004, and then completely pformed into a private enterprise. Since then, it has been soaring up and successfully listing, and has made the seemingly unattractive down garment business to the extreme by means of the capital market platform.

The path of development and evolution not only reflects the growth track of private enterprises under complex ecology, but also reflects Gao Dekang's skillful and skillful financial skills in the relationship between government and enterprises.

By changing the trend, remove the red hat.

According to media reports, in 70s of last century, Gao Dekang graduated from junior high school and studied sewing with his father, and soon became a well known tailor.

In 1975, he served as the leader of the sewing team of only 8 home sewing machines and 11 farmers in Shan Jing Village (later renamed KangBo Village). He ran through the clothing processing and selling business between Changshu and Shanghai year after year.

In the 80s of last century, the clothing factory led by Gao Dekang began to undertake garment processing for Santa Claus and Xiu Dun in Shanghai, and gradually grew into a local famous clothing enterprise. In May 1991, it set up a collective enterprise -- KangBo craft fashion factory.

Before 1994, domestic legislation was carried out in accordance with the different forms of ownership of enterprises. Three foreign-invested enterprises law and the law of the whole people's ownership of industrial enterprises, the Provisional Regulations on private enterprises, the regulations on the collective ownership of enterprises and the regulations of the enterprises on collective ownership of cities and towns were promulgated.

This legislative tradition makes all the standards of value judgment, and confirms the differences of different ownership enterprises in legal form, which, to a certain extent, leads to unfair competition among enterprises.

The company law, promulgated in December 1993, for the first time diluted the difference of ownership and divided it into limited liability companies and Limited by Share Ltd according to the different forms of responsibility and capital structure of investors.

In the fast developing KangBo craft fashion factory, when fashion is a collective enterprise, with the introduction of the company law, Gao Dekang began planning the establishment of a joint-stock enterprise.

In June 30, 1994, the KangBo craft fashion factory, Shanghai earth Barry Garment Co., Ltd., Shanghai integrated garment and leather goods company, Agricultural Bank of China, Jiangsu trust and investment company Changshou City office and five employees of the company jointly registered the Limited by Share Ltd, namely, bosden. Among them, the KangBo craft fashion factory owns 78.9% of its shares, and the other four party shareholders hold 21.1% of the total interest.

According to the company law at that time, the establishment of a joint-stock limited company needs at least 5 promoter shareholders, so the Limited by Share Ltd was established as the main body of the Kang Bo craft factory and jointly with other shareholders.

Different from the Wenzhou model characterized by individual and private economy, the "South of Jiangsu model" represented by Shagang and red bean collective enterprises once held high the banner of collective economy and came stubbornly to the beginning of this century.

But with the development of the economy and the change of the market, the once brilliant "South of Jiangsu model" exposes a variety of drawbacks, such as the unclear property relations, the indistinction between government and business, the low motivation and the single investment entity leading to high liabilities.

Finally, in the mid 90s of last century, the state began to strictly control the scale of credit. Under the macro background, the crisis of township enterprises in South of Jiangsu was exploded by high debt. Tens of thousands of township enterprises in Jiangsu launched a large scale restructuring, and private enterprises began to rise.

With this trend of reform, the KangBo craft fashion factory, a collective enterprise, has also started restructuring.

According to Bosideng prospectus, in January 1997, as the main shareholder of Bosideng, the KangBo craft fashion factory defined and defined the ownership of the assets owned by collectives. Gao Dekang was identified as having a 88% stake in the KangBo craft fashion factory, while the village committee of Shan Jing Village and Changshou City Bai Zhen Town asset investment and investment company (the prospectus shows that both are independent entities) have the remaining 12% stake.

After the completion of the property rights definition procedure, in January 31, 1997, Gao Dekang became the 69.43% largest shareholder holding Bosideng, and Bosideng officially removed the "red hat".

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Holding Hualian holdings, and then "red hat".

After reform, Gao Dekang's Bosideng ushered in a new stage of rapid development.

In 1997, Bosideng realized sales income of 246 million yuan, and realized sales income of 52 million yuan in 1998 1-4. As of April 30, 1998, the total assets of Bosideng were 335 million yuan and net assets of 170 million yuan.

However, surprisingly, at the time, Gao de Kang pferred the majority of Bosideng shares to the state-owned listed company hualian holdings.

The annual report of Hualian holdings in 1998 shows that in October 28th of that year, it raised 51% stake in Bosideng by Gao Dekang, Jiangsu Xue Zhong Xing Garments Co., Ltd. and Jiangsu KangBo Biological Engineering Co., Ltd., and the share pfer price was determined on the basis of Boston's net asset value up to July 31, 1998, and the total price was 117 million 150 thousand yuan.

After the pfer, Bosideng officially became a controlling subsidiary of Hualian holding 51%. Gao Dekang's shareholding ratio of Bosideng dropped to 26.54%, ranking two among shareholders. The remaining 22.46% stake was distributed among many state-owned, collective, individual, company employees and other shareholders.

After the completion of the equity pfer, Gao Dekang served as the president of the company, and the position of the chairman was delivered to the chairman of Hualian holdings, the largest shareholder, Dong Binggen.

Gao Dekang, the founder of the company, was not willing to hold such a small stake. In December 2000, Gao Dekang began to concentrate on acquiring the remaining minority shareholders.

Bosideng prospectus shows that on December 2000 18-20, the Dezhou Kang Xin Industrial Co., Ltd., controlled by the Gao Dekang family (Dezhou Kang Xin), bought about 19.46% of the minority shareholders in Bosideng. At this point, the proportion of shares held by Gao Dekang and his family as two shareholders rose to 46.1%.

It is noteworthy that Gao Dekang bought shares from one of Changshou City's trust and investment companies, one of Boston's original promoters, and the price is far lower than other individual and collective shareholders.

However, when the two shareholders increase their holdings, the majority shareholders of listed companies are holding down.

In April 14, 2001, when Gao Dekang increased his holdings for 4 months, Hualian holdings announced that in order to optimize the shareholder structure of Bosideng, introduce strategic partners, open up new investment channels, and create conditions for the next diversified development. After consultations, the Boston audited December 31, 2000's net asset value per share rose to 15% on the base, and sold 3% Bosideng equity (924 thousand shares) to Suzhou Shuncheng Cci Capital Ltd (Suzhou Shuncheng) at a price of 14.12 yuan per share, with a turnover of about 13 million yuan.

According to the announcement, Suzhou has become an independent third party.

After 3% of the equity pfer, the Bosideng share held by Hualian holdings dropped from 51% to 48%, and it was only one step away from the two shareholder Gao Dekang's shareholding ratio (Figure 4).

Two shareholders' holdings and large shareholders' reduction, the shareholding ratio between them has become the same. Before and after linking up, we can not help but think of Boston's next step in capital operation.

Stranding and listing

After the action of the big shareholders and the two shareholders, the market came out in 2001.

Later, the announcement of China Federation of holdings showed that after the formal acquisition of bostin's 51% control in the end of 1998, Boston began to accept the guidance of the operation of the national letter of securities in 2000.

In August 10, 2001, after the approval of the shareholders' meeting, it was expected to apply for the first public issuance of 40 million shares of RMB ordinary shares (A shares).

After a year of Guoxin tutoring, that is, at the end of August 2001, bostin won the inspection and acceptance of the Nanjing Securities Regulatory Commission's office of the Securities Regulatory Commission.

In the period of China Union holdings, the performance of the company was remarkable: the annual report showed that the annual growth rate of income reached 34% and the net profit compound growth rate was 28% in 1999-2002 years, and the net asset yield reached 35% in 2001 and 28% in 2002.

The famous A share listed company has also greatly enhanced its brand awareness. The brand of Bosideng was recognized as a well-known trademark in China by the State Administration of industry and Commerce in 1999. In September 2002, Bosideng and its "Xue Zhong Fei" were selected as "China's famous brands". Bosideng, as the only enterprise in the national textile industry, was identified as one of 16 "internationally competitive Chinese enterprises", together with Haier group and Lenovo Group. The Bosideng down jacket was presented to the Russian President Putin, Finland President Halonen and Kufuor President Kufuor by the Ministry of foreign affairs. In 2003, Bosideng became the only enterprise in the domestic feather and down products industry to get the exemption certificate. Under the big tree, it is good to enjoy the cool. During the "red hat" of Hualian holdings head, Bosideng not only made rapid progress in its business performance, but more importantly, backed by the textile industry.

So high quality assets and brand image, Bosideng's listing appears to be a bright road.

However, in the same period, the domestic stock market situation changed suddenly.

In 2001, the domestic stock market experienced a roller coaster Market: the market took 2077 points as the starting point of the new year, and climbed to 2245 points in June 14th. After that, the stock index flew straight, with a vertical difference of 730 points, reaching a "hard landing" at 1515 o'clock in October 22nd, a decline of 20.62% and 30.03% in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, and the largest decline in the index since 1994, and about 300000000000 yuan in the total value of A shares in two cities.

In terms of raising funds, the total amount of financing in the Shanghai stock market in 2001 was 95 billion 749 million yuan, an increase of only 4.08% over the previous year, and the total financing of Shenzhen listed companies was 23 billion 473 million yuan, representing a decrease of 39 billion 420 million yuan over the previous year and a decrease of 62.68%.

Bosideng, who intends to list A shares, feels the chill of the capital market in the cold winter.

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Under the planning of investment banks, Bosideng turned to split H-share to be listed in Hongkong.

In March 22, 2002, Hua Lian holdings announced that it decided that Bosideng would not apply for the issue of A shares for the time being. Instead, it would apply for the issuance of H-shares in the Hongkong market. The issue size would be 40 million shares (excluding the 15% excess allotment option), and the French Paris Peregrine Finance Company Limited was appointed as the sponsor, and the official application to the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Hongkong exchange for issuing H shares was made in that month.

However, it is doubtful that in the two years since then, Bosideng's separation and listing has gone nowhere.

According to Huang Lichong, managing director of Sheng Fu capital, for the domestic A share listed companies to spin off their subsidiaries to Hongkong or abroad, until July 2004, the SFC issued the notice on regulating the listing of enterprises listed in the listed companies to overseas listing. The net profit of the listed companies is clearly not allowed to exceed 50% of the net profit of the consolidated statements of the listed companies, and the net assets should not exceed 30% of the net assets of the consolidated statements of the listed companies.

Prior to that, although domestic securities laws and regulations did not clearly stipulate, in the specific implementation, if the subsidiary's net assets, turnover or profit accounted for more than 30% of the listed company, the SFC generally did not approve it.

In May 2003, the Changchun high tech spin off subsidiary went to Hong Kong to be listed and was voted down by the SFC.

Huang Li Chong, who was then its sponsor, confirmed that the reason for the SFC was that some of its business profits were more than 30% of the profits of the parent company.

Over the same period, media reports reported that the same solution was applied to the longevity division.

However, Hua Lian holdings issued a Clarification Announcement two days later (June 20, 2003), saying that the application of Boston's spin off listing was still under the examination of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the media coverage was serious.

Bosteng is still facing the same problem as longevity creatures. What is the role of Bosideng for Hualian holdings? Research finds that since the end of 1998, Bosideng has contributed more than 60% of its profits to Hualian holdings every year, and in 2001 it has been as high as 80%, far exceeding the 30% bottom line of the industry.

Therefore, from this point of view, whether Bosideng's application for splitting the listing is not groundless.

Next, the suspense of Bosideng's spin off is becoming more and more complicated.

In 2003, Hualian Holdings Limited formally launched the construction of PTA and PET Petrochemical new material projects with huge demand for funds, aiming to cultivate them into new core industries and profit sources.

This does not exclude the need to reduce reliance on Bosideng and create conditions for Bosideng's spin off.

However, people did not calculate well. In 2003, Bosideng's performance fell sharply, and Hualian holdings annual report in 2003 showed that shareholders expressed concern about Bosideng's business prospects.

On the one hand is a huge petrochemical project with huge financial pressure. On the other hand, Bosideng, whose performance has dropped sharply, is faced with the risk of "gold becoming iron".

Hualian Holdings Co operated with Gao Dekang at a low price.

Bosideng further pick "red hat" Hualian holdings to sell Bosideng shares at a low price.

In July 2004, Hualian holdings announced that it would sell all Bosideng shares held by it.

The announcement shows that the 48% stake in Bosideng held by Hualian holdings is taken over by three parties: pferring 35% stake to Zhejiang San Hong International feather Co., Ltd. (referred to as "Zhejiang San Hong"), pferring 8% stake to Ji'nan Jiahua shopping plaza limited liability company (referred to as Ji'nan Jiahua) and pferring 5% of the shares to Jiangsu KangBo Industrial Co., Ltd.

The selling price is based on the audited net asset value of Boston as at 31 May 2004, and the total price is 209796852.48 yuan.

The announcement of Hualian holdings shows that before the pfer of shares, in order to clear up the takeover obstacles, Bosideng allocated a dividend of 333218572 yuan to all shareholders by the unaudited profit of 31 as of December 2003.

As of May 31, 2004, Bosideng shareholders' rights and interests decreased to 437076776 yuan, and shareholders' rights and interests of Bosideng shareholding held by Hualian holdings dropped to 209796852.48 yuan.

As a result of the acquisition of net assets, the move not only significantly reduced the capital pressure of the equity acquirers, but also according to the provisions of the tax law at that time, the difference between the equity pfer price and the equity cost price in the general equity pfer of domestic enterprises did not distinguish between dividends and pfer proceeds, and the enterprise income tax was paid in full.

And Bosideng can distribute the dividends ahead of the pfer of shares, which is exempt from the enterprise income tax of this part, thereby greatly reducing the tax burden that the Hualian holding company must bear on the pfer of shares in Bosideng.

Bosideng, as the main source of profits of Hualian holdings, and whether it is reasonable to pfer net assets parity is contrasted with that. A month ago, Hua Lian holdings also sold 20% of its subsidiary subsidiary, Yuyao Hualian, but the pricing of shares sold by the two companies is quite different.

In June 19, 2004, Hualian holdings announced that it would sell 20% stake in Yuyao Hualian, and the pferee calculated the premium by 55% based on the net assets audited by Yuyao Union in December 2003 and 31 yuan after the dividend distribution of 33 million yuan in Yuyao Hualian.

Why can Yuyao Hualian take a 55% premium on net assets? Is its asset quality superior to Bosideng?

Hualian holdings announcements show that Yuyao Hualian and Bosideng are all Hualian holdings in 1998.

Yuyao Hualian formerly known as the first cotton mill in Yuyao, the main business is cotton yarn, cotton, clothing, fiber manufacturing and processing of finished products.

In 1998, Hualian holdings raised the 51% stake in Bosideng by raising the proceeds from the issuance of additional funds, and acquired the 90% stake in Yuyao Hualian in the following year. Both of them purchased the price according to the net asset value of Target Corp as at the time of acquisition. They were listed in Hualian holdings in 1998 and 1999, and sold between June 2004 and July.

What is the difference between the performance and profit contribution of the two companies during the Hualian holding period?

The study found that in the 5 years of Hualian holdings, the profitability of the two companies is quite different.

Bosideng's net asset yield is much higher than that of Yuyao Hualian. Bosideng's annual net profit contribution to Hualian holdings is above 60%, up to 80%, and is the pillar industry and core profit source of Hualian holdings.

Yuyao Hualian only contributes about 4-12% net profit to listed companies every year.

As a result, Boston's profitability and asset quality are much better than that of Yuyao Hualian.

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Secondly, Bosideng and Yuyao Hualian share pfer, Boston 48% of the equity pfer means the sale of Bosideng control rights, while Yuyao Hualian District 20% equity pfer, Hualian holdings still holds 51%, and the control of Yuyao Hualian is unchanged.

Generally speaking, regardless of domestic or foreign equity pfer, because large shareholders with large stakes often enjoy extra income over the proportion of their holdings, that is, the proceeds of control, the pfer of controlled shares will generally consider the premium of control. However, the pfer of Boston's 48% equity does not reflect the value of control right.

Moreover, the value of "Bosideng" brand with numerous halos on its head is not reflected in the pfer.

In the sale announcement of Hualian holdings, it explains: during the 2001-2003 years, Boston's net assets yield rate showed a decreasing trend year by year, and the market share also declined gradually, and there was a large business risk.

It is undeniable that in 2003, it was indeed a poor year in Bosideng's history. However, the development of events later proved that the profitability of Bosideng, which was considered to be a "big business risk", has been progresses by leaps and bounds since its departure from Hualian holdings in 2004. Especially in the year when Gao Dekang gained control, his 10 month income increased by 52% compared with that of 2003. Net profit increased by nearly 5 times than that in 2003, and net asset yield reached 37%, and all aspects of financial indicators reached a new high.

Why was there a sharp decline in Boston's performance on the eve of the sale in 2004? Bosideng prospectus was interpreted as being affected by the warm winter of that year.

Facts have proved that warm winter does have a huge impact on Bosideng's business performance. However, it is worth mentioning that it is similar to 2003, and 2006 is also a famous warm winter in our history. However, as of the 12 months of March 31, 2007, Bosideng sales exceeded 5 billion 600 million yuan, and net profit reached 614 million yuan, while net profit rate declined compared with the same period last year (14%), but still up to 11%, far better than the net profit rate of 2003 3%.

For the warm winter, why is there a significant difference in performance? The specific reason is unknown. However, it is undeniable that the sharp decline in 2003's performance has objectively created favorable conditions for Gao Dekang to lower the price of Bosideng equity, and the brilliant performance as of March 31, 2007 has also made a final push for Bosideng's listing.

From all above, the price of Bosideng should not be lower than that of Yuyao Hualian. However, the actual situation is that Bosideng's 48% equity pfer is only sold on net assets, while the Yuyao Hualian, which looks mediocre, has been sold at a price of 55% of net asset premium.

Where is the mystery? The study found that both of them sell assets to the third party on the surface, but the pferee of Bosideng shares is closely related to Gao Dekang, who is the two shareholder, which may provide a clue from the side.

Gao Dekang was fully controlled by Boston.

The information disclosed by Hualian holdings shows that the two pferee of the 48% pferee, KangBo industry and Ji'nan Jiahua, have a direct equity relationship with Gao Dekang: Gao Dekang owns 70% of KangBo industry, and the Gao family holds 35% stake in Ji'nan Jiahua.

Only Zhejiang, which has the largest share of Bosideng shares (35%), seems to have no stake in Gao Dekang.

However, the shareholding structure of KangBo industry shows that Zhang Junhua, the actual controller of Zhejiang San Hong, is the legal representative of Ji'nan Jiahua, chairman of the board, general manager Li Maonian, and Gao Dekang are all shareholders of KangBo industry, holding 20%, 5% and 70% respectively.

As a result, the three companies that were given the 48% stake in Boston have a seemingly unusual relationship with Gao Dekang.

The announcement said that in addition to equity relations, the main business of Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua has the upstream and downstream relations with the main business of Bosideng. Zhejiang San Hong is an important supplier of raw materials for Bosideng. Ji'nan Jiahua is a strategic partner of Bosideng down garment sales.

Some market participants pointed out that the three companies were shell companies that Gao Dekang could control.

After that, the pfer of the original price of Bosideng shares to Gao Dekang by Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua will also confirm the tacit understanding between the three companies from the side.

It was not until 2007 when Bosideng went public that its prospectus was disclosed. On the day of the signing of the 48% equity pfer agreement in Bosideng (July 26, 2004), Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua respectively signed the option agreement with Gao Dekang.

The option agreement was not mentioned in the announcement of the sale of Bosideng by Hualian holdings.

According to the agreement, if Bosideng's financial position is not up to a standard set by the parties, Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua have the right to pfer the shares of Bosideng (35% and 8% respectively) to Gao De Kang in the half year of the pferee (July 27, 2004 -2005 January 27th).

No mention was made about the financial standard.

After the expiration of half a year, in January 24 and 28, 2005, Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua pferred their Bosideng shares to Gao Dekang controlled Dezhou de Kang Investment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "de Kang investment") at the original price, and the share pfer was retroactive to June 1, 2004.

At this point, Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua completed the role of "crossing the bridge" and withdrew from Bosideng.

The 48% Bosideng share held by Hualian Holdings has been absorbed into the arms by Gao Dekang at the net asset price parity since June 1, 2004.

At the same time, in April 2001, Suzhou Shuncheng, who was granted a 3% stake in Bosideng from Hualian holdings, was also signed on the same day in the signing of the option agreement between Zhejiang San Hong and Ji'nan Jiahua and Gao Dekang, that is to say, in July 26, 2004, it signed a share pfer agreement with Gao Dekang controlled de Kang investment. The price of Bosideng will be pferred to de Kang as a result of Boston's net asset value up to May 31, 2004 and its 3% stake.

So far, the 51% Bosideng share sold to Hualian holdings at the end of 1998 was returned to Gao Dekang in June 2004 with the net asset value at that time. Gao Dekang once again controlled the vast majority of Bosideng shares.

Bosideng is uncovered, and once again removed the "red hat" and pformed itself into a purely private enterprise.

As of February 2005, as Zhang Junhua, Li Maonian and Gao Jianzhong were small shareholders of the KangBo industry, they indirectly held a minority stake in Bosideng, and this minority share was also returned to Gao Dekang under the name of Gao Dekang with the withdrawal of three people.

The prospectus shows that Zhang Jun Hua pferred his rights to Gao Dekang in June 2005, while Li Maonian and Gao Jianzhong pferred their rights to Gao Dekang in August 2006.

After the completion of the paction, Gao Dekang owns the 100% interest of KangBo industry, thus owning Bosideng 100% stake.

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Bosideng down jacket: "hat skill" gorgeous turn

2010/10/29/8:42 source: new wealth

"Pure private" changes foreign capital again, Bosideng becomes "last red chip".

In June 2004, nearly 6 years after the departure of chairman Gao Dekang of the Limited by Share Ltd, he retook the controlling stake of the company and became the two chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer again.

However, Bosteng today is far from the past.

When Bosideng was bought by Hualian holdings in 1998, its sales income in 1997 was only 246 million yuan, but by 2003, it had exceeded 1 billion 700 million yuan.

After Gao Dekang took the helm again, Bosideng's performance explode in explosive growth. From 2004, in the next 3 years, its annual compound income growth rate reached 50%, and net profit compound growth rate reached 45%. To 12 months in the 31 months of March 2007, Bosideng's income reached 5 billion 600 million yuan, and net profit was 614 million yuan.

During the Hualian holding period, Bosideng's capital path was constantly twists and turns, A shares crashed and H-shares lost.

It is precisely because of the complete withdrawal of the state-owned shareholder in 2004 years that Bosideng completed the pformation from "pure private" enterprises to the continuation of its capital "story".

If we do not change the holding status of state capital, whether Bosideng can attract foreign capital to join the stock market and maintain the investment enthusiasm of the international capital market, there is great doubt.

In June 2004, after Gao Dekang regain control power, Bosideng rebuilt its momentum and formally embarked on a red chip listing tour.

The first step is to build domestic business and equity structure of listed entities.

In 2005, Bosideng officially launched the restructuring of its domestic business. By setting up a new company and acquiring subsidiaries of a series of predecessor entities (original parent group), it built the domestic framework of the listed main body, and built the listing main body into the business of focusing on brand management, R & D, design, raw material procurement, outsourcing production and marketing (Figure 12), while the original parent group continued to undertake the production and manufacture of down and OEM processing.

The second step: build the main body of overseas listing

After the adjustment of domestic business and the establishment of shareholding structure, in July 10, 2006, Gao Dekang registered Bosideng International Holdings Limited in Cayman as the main body of listing. The next day, Bosideng International Clothing Co., Ltd. (Bosideng BVI) was set up as an intermediary holding company for the acquisition and direct holding of domestic Affiliated Companies.

At that time, the effective time for the listing of red chips - "Regulations on the acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign investors" (No. 10) is less than two months in September 8, 2006. During this period, the urgency of time can be imagined before completing a series of steps such as pre market financing and return purchase.

Third step: pre listing financing, foreign capital earnings ratio of 9 times

Immediately after that, Olympic investment was officially launched by an investment company under direct investment by HSBC.

In September 5, 2006, the Olympic investment subscribed the convertible bonds issued by Boston on a US $20 million basis.

Because at this time, it is in the nodal point of "No. 10". In order to prevent the uncertainty of reorganization, the Olympic investment stipulates that if Bosideng has completed the revision of foreign-invested enterprises within 3 months of the domestic Affiliated Companies's business license, then PEAK will have the option to invest in both the conversion and the capital redemption of convertible bonds. "" is not an option.

Conversely, convertible bonds will be converted to 2135 convertible convertible redeemable preferred shares (series A shares).

Prospectus shows that around September 2006, Bosideng in the domestic series of equity pfer has been approved by the examination and approval agency, successfully passed the first pass.

In September 22nd, according to the agreement, Olympic investment converted convertible bonds into 2135 series A shares.

In order to protect their rights and interests, foreign institutions require A series preferred stock to enjoy a large number of priority over all common shareholders, similar to convertible bonds, which enjoy dual guarantees of stock swap and redemption.

1. the right of redemption.

The two sides have agreed that Olympic investment can be redeemed at any time in any of the following circumstances: a) a major breach of contract matters outside of the A share holders; b) the net profit after the audit is less than $25 million; c) Gao Dekang is no longer employed by Bosideng or no longer holds an important management position; d) no trademark has been pferred to the listing body in accordance with the time specified in the investment agreement.

The redemption price is determined by principal plus 8% of the year's returns.

2. change of equity.

According to the agreement, if the listing process is going well, without a series of cases mentioned above, the series A shares will be converted into ordinary shares immediately after Bosideng's initial public offering and no longer have priority over ordinary common shareholders.

In addition to the direct investment of 20 million dollars, in July 30, 2006, the Olympic investment also issued a loan of $50 million to Bob's major shareholder, Kang Bo, which was pferred to Bosideng on the same day.

In September 5, 2006, Bashi Tomuyasuhiro issued 5336 convertible preferred stock (series B shares).

In September 22nd, KangBo invested 5336 series of B shares to Olympic investment, as a consideration of Olympic investment abandoning the right to repay us $50 million in loans.

That is, in order to ensure the safety of funds, Olympic investment will extend loans to KangBo investment which has more repayment power. After Bosideng crossed the policy threshold of "No. 10", overseas funds would be formally invested in Bosideng, and the loan would be converted into a series of B shares of Bosideng 5336 shares.

The two sides agreed that B series shares do not enjoy the redemption rights of A series shares, but only the right to change shares.

The prospectus revealed that the 2135 share series A shares and 5336 series B shares accounted for 3.54% and 8.84% of Boston's pre IPO share as at the full day, respectively.

That is to say, Olympic investment totaled 12.38% of Boston's shares before listing with us $70 million (Figure 14). The default market value of Bosideng reached US $565 million, about 9 times the net profit of Bosteng as at the 12 months ended March 31, 2006.

According to domestic similar projects invested by overseas funds, it is quite impressive to invest in the traditional clothing industry of Bosideng with a price earnings ratio of 9 times.

This is inseparable from the ownership structure and good brand value before Bosideng's listing.

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Fourth step: return purchase

Since July 2006, according to a series of pfer agreements, the predecessor entities have pferred their trademarks and domain names to the subjects of listing without delay. All assets related to the brand management and OEM management business of the down jacket have been injected into the Affiliated Companies listed in the territory.

After the assets were injected into the domestic entities and received the return purchase funds provided by HSBC direct investment, Bosideng BVI began to acquire the operating entities in China in August 2006.

Within a short period of less than a month, a series of equity pfer was approved by the competent examination and approval authority. Jiangsu Bosideng, Shanghai Bing Jie and Shandong Bosideng were pformed into Sino foreign joint ventures respectively, Bosideng international clothing owned 51% and Bosideng BVI had 49% stake.

Similarly, Shanghai double feather has been pformed into a Sino foreign joint venture company after two equity pfers. Bosideng international clothing owns 75% and Bosideng BVI owns 25% stake.

So far, Bosideng's main operating entity in China has been pformed into a foreign-funded enterprise, and the listing reorganization has been completed.

The fifth step: listing success

2007 is the peak period for the clothing and footwear companies to go public. In 2007, BELLE international, Anta sports and China were listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange.

With this wave of listing fever, in October 11, 2007, after three years of listing A shares and H-shares, Bosideng finally boarded the "red chip last train", issuing 1 billion 870 million new shares to Hongkong and overseas investors at HK $3.28 per share, and successfully landed at the main board market of Hong Kong stock exchange, raising about 836 million US dollars.

Olympic investment is the right to sell shares to the public to sell 118 million of the old shares.

For overseas institutions, the series A shares and B shares held by Olympic investment are exchanged for 212228613 shares and 530571532 ordinary shares before the global sale.

After the conversion, HSBC's shareholding cost per share of ordinary shares is about HK $0.74, which is 77.4% higher than the issue price.

Therefore, in the short time around one year and three months, the yield of HSBC's direct investment reached 343%.

Bosideng went public in Hong Kong, and eventually introduced 5 basic investors, including Henderson real estate chairman Li Zhaoji, Chang Long chairman Li Jiacheng, new world development chairman Zheng Yutong, China Life Insurance and Disheng chairman Dickson Poon, and invested 25 million US dollars (about HK $195 million), or about HK $975 million.

Bosideng became another mainland consumer company that was touted by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange after BELLE international.

Seasonal risk restricts stock price performance. First, buy back and buy two arrows, and it is inevitable that stock prices will become immortal.

However, when compared with the international capital chasing in the stock market, the market performance of Bosideng was not satisfactory.

On the first day of listing, Bosideng opened at HK $3.85, but at the lowest price of HK $3.41, it closed up 3.96% higher than the HK $3.28, which is far below the forecast of some market participants.

Since then, Bosideng's share price has been explored all the way, and it has been less than HK $3.28 since November 2nd of that year. The huge increase in the medium-term performance also failed to activate the stock price, and at the end of the year, it received HK $2.5, which had fallen by more than 20% compared with the stock price, and the performance in the ten new stocks listed in October was relatively backward.

Bosideng's stock performance is poor. On the one hand, it is due to the bull market in 2007. At this time, the listing is conducive to the pricing of the stock options, while raising more funds while reducing the cost of financing, but the price is too high, which will restrict the subsequent stock price performance. Some analysts believe that when the stock price is priced at 26 times earnings in the 2007 fiscal year, the valuation is not attractive. On the other hand, the most important reason is that its single down jacket product line is seasonally restricted, and the anticipation of warm winter is like a dangling sword, which makes it unable to get rid of the impression of relying on heaven for food in the minds of investors.

"The seasonality of corporate earnings and the worry of warm winter are the main reasons for Boston's share price," said Peng Weixin, a strategist at Sun Hung Kai.

Credit Suisse also said that the climate of 2007 winter was uncertain, and the winter of 2006 was exceptionally warm, eroding the profit margin of Bosideng to a certain extent.

Bosideng's 2006 financial report showed that due to the unsalable sales of warm winter clothes, it made a provision of 257 million yuan for inventory impairment.

Moreover, at the end of February 2008, Goldman Sachs, one of the sponsors of Bosideng, sharply reduced its target price from HK $4.05 to HK $2.88, even lower than the issue price of IPO, which is also quite rare in Hongkong market.

At that time, Goldman Sachs quoted Bosideng management as saying that the sales trend of the company after the lunar new year was weaker than expected, mainly due to the snow disaster affecting pportation, and the price war of competitors also had an impact on the company.

Goldman Sachs lowered its earnings forecast in 2007 to 11% to 1 billion 100 million yuan in its report.

Under the influence of many unfavorable factors, Bosideng continued to plunge after breaking through the stock price. It fell to 1.1 yuan from the first day of listing, and slipped to 1.1 yuan to stabilize. (March 20, 2008), the highest decline was over 70%, quite tragic.

The stock price has fallen sharply, and the big shareholder Gao de Kang is also unable to sit idly by, and hastily mobilizes the capital to save the market.

According to the HKEx data, Gao Tak Kang entered the market on 6 trading days from March 25, 2008 to April 1st, and increased 6 million 634 thousand shares of the company. The average price per share ranged from 1.229 yuan to 1.387 yuan, and the shareholding increased from 65.95% to 66.03%.

Meanwhile, since April 16th, Bosideng began to repurchase shares in the two tier market. Bosideng's 2007-2008 financial year report showed that Bosteng bought 57 million 726 thousand shares from the HKEx from April 16, 2008 to July 20th, the price was HK $1.35-1.48, and the shares were revoked.

Obviously, compared with the timing of the company's repurchase, Gao Dekang's time to enter the market is much better, and the major shareholder's holding price is obviously lower than the company's repurchase price.

Although this is not a bad rule in terms of trading rules, objectively speaking, large shareholders should first increase their holdings and buy back companies after the company.

However, under the influence of the global financial crisis and the company's tax evasion rumors, the company's massive repurchase and large shareholder's holdings did not stop the stock price from continuing to explore. By September 20, 2008, Bosideng had initiated more than 40 shares repurchase, and the amount of purchase was often tens of millions of Hong Kong dollars.

In one week or even 5 consecutive repurchases, the frequency of the Hongkong capital market enterprise buyback precedent, but it also failed to save the falling share price.

It is embarrassing that in October 2008, when Bosideng celebrated its listing at 1st anniversary, the company's share price had dropped to below HK $1, which became a genuine penny stock. It basically lost its financing function. Gao Dekang, who had hoped for the capital market, could feel it.

In December 24, 2008, Bosideng announced the 2008-2009 financial year semi annual report. The results showed that Bosideng's current income decreased by 38.1% compared with the same period last year, with a profit of only 50 million 927 thousand yuan, a decrease of 81.4% compared with the same period last year.

One of the reasons for the explanation of earnings is that the seasonal risk of the single down garment product is reflected again in the 2007-2008 winter. The confidence of investors has been hit again. In March 9, 2009, Bosideng stock price even dropped to HK $0.46, and the stock price fell by 86%.

In fact, Gao Dekang has long noticed the risk of overly dependent on down jacket business.

At the beginning of his launch, Bosideng had publicly stated that in order to make better use of the retail network, the company intends to sell casual clothes in the form of OEM, so that retail outlets will sell "Bosideng" brand costumes throughout the year.

In Bosideng's bulletin, it also mentioned many times that "the company has formulated the development strategy of" four seasons products "to smooth the seasonal risk of single down garment products.

In fact, Bosideng's men's clothing business has already started operation, and this is the son Gao Dekang who returned from abroad. Gao Xiaodong is responsible for this business.

In the process of acquiring this business and implementing the strategy of "four seasons" of products, Bosideng has also interpreted a classic case of "connected pactions as non related pactions".

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Related party pactions are non related pactions, Bosideng high price acquisition of large shareholders related assets, to "four seasons" pformation

Bosideng suddenly issued a notice of "related paction - limited purchase right and conditional purchase option agreement". According to the notice, Bosideng's affiliated party Gao Xiaodong (Gao Dekang's son) holds 83% of Bosideng, Changshu, and intends to pfer 70% of the shares of Jiangsu KangBo Garments Co., Ltd. (men's clothing company), which produces men's clothing, to the Affiliated Companies, Changchun, an indirect wholly owned Affiliated Companies of another shareholder of the men's clothing company. The pfer cost is 385 million yuan. According to the non competition agreement, Bosideng has a preemptive right for the asset as a related party. Moreover, the related conditions of the 70% equity offered by Bosteng to Changlong's men's clothing company are not superior to those provided by Jo Namishitonabashito. In August 29, 2008,

According to the announcement, Jo Namishito was originally an entity engaged in men's clothing business, which was injected into the men's clothing company in April 2008.

The men's clothing company was founded in October 13, 2006. It is owned by Bosideng (70%) and independent third party Sheng Yi (30%) in Changshu.

According to the unaudited financial statements of Boston in 2006 and 2007 in, the net profit of men's clothing business reached 41 million 283 thousand yuan and 52 million 850 thousand yuan respectively.

It is worth noting that the price of the 385 million yuan pfer of men's clothing company in Boston, Changshu, implies that the company's price is 550 million yuan (3.85/70%), and the net profit of the men's clothing company in 2007 is 52 million 850 thousand yuan, which is equivalent to 10.4 times price earnings ratio.

This is a good deal for Bosteng, who is eager to expand the four seasons clothing business. It is expected that Bosteng gave up the right of preemption, and at the same time, he obtained an option at the nominal cost of 10 Hong Kong dollars. That is, the men's clothing company has the right (but no responsibility) to buy all the issued shares of the company through the purchase of Ying Hui (the direct wholly owned Affiliated Companies of Sheng Yi Qi Wei Jin) under the condition of a certain win, which will be indirectly acquired by BVI, which owns 100% of the men's clothing company.

Bosteng listed a number of reasons in the announcement, including "first, in view of the fact that Changshu Bosteng injected men's clothing business into men's clothing companies in April 2008, Menswear's men's clothing business history is relatively short, so it can not guarantee that the operation and financial performance of menswear companies can be consistent and sustained growth under the influence of macroeconomic factors and the competition situation of China's men's wear industry.

In addition, there is no guarantee that the senior management team of menswear and other key personnel will remain in the men's clothing company. Second, the exercise of preemption will only allow the company to have a 70% stake in men's clothing company.

There is no guarantee that the company will be able to acquire the remaining 30% equity of the men's clothing company. Therefore, the management and equity control of the men's clothing company may be limited. As an overseas investor of the men's clothing company, Sheng Yi currently contributes its resources to men's clothing company to explore suitable overseas markets.

Therefore, the directors think that before deciding whether to buy men's clothing companies, they need more time to assess the advantages of overseas expansion plans for the financial performance of menswear companies. Finally, even if Bosideng is approved by independent board of directors and independent shareholders, it can not give priority to purchase rights, and may also buy arrangements under the option agreement according to the conditions, and exercise purchase options in the future when the board thinks it is appropriate, so as to indirectly buy all the shares of menswear companies "and so on.

Although such an interpretation is reasonable, it can not be logically scrutiny.

First of all, Bosteng's men's clothing business has actually started. Originally, it was operated by Bosideng, Changshu, but it was only injected into the men's clothing company in April 2008. From this point of view, in fact, the history of men's clothing management is not short, and the business development trend is very excellent from the continuous growth of men's clothing business.

Second, since giving Bosideng BVI the option to purchase all the equity of menswear company, it also shows that Sheng Yi, another shareholder of menswear company, has the intention to sell shares and does not plan to run for a long time. Therefore, it is not realistic to hope Sheng Yi to go all out to run men's clothing, because even after the camp is ready, it will finally be sold to Bosideng.

Nevertheless, the matter was approved at the shareholders' meeting in September 26, 2008.

Bosideng's choice of purchasing men's clothing company is more than expected. In May 15, 2009, Bosideng announced again that in May 15, 2009, Bosideng BVI issued a notice to Kingway to exercise its buying option and demanded that Jinwei sell all the issued share capital of Ying Hui at the purchase price of not more than 650 million yuan.

After the completion of the purchase, Menswear will be an indirect wholly owned Affiliated Companies of Bosideng.

The announcement showed that the performance of men's clothing company exceeded expectations. The net profit after audited for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2009 was 83 million 936 thousand yuan. Therefore, the net profit target of the men's clothing company as stipulated in the conditional purchase option agreement as at the end of March 31, 2009 has been audited after tax (not less than 55 million yuan).

The acquisition was completed in May 26, 2009.

It is worth noting that the price of Boston's 658 million yuan purchase price is actually 20% higher than that of the company which has a preemption of about 550 million yuan. Why does it have to go all the way? The study found that the intention of Bosideng's move is visible from its annual report 2009/2010.

Boston's 2009-2010 annual report, released in July 26, 2010, disclosed the balance sheet of menswear company (Table 5). Bosideng spent 658 million yuan to acquire the net asset value of this asset for 366 million yuan. Bosideng bought menswear company generated goodwill of about 293 million yuan. It is worth noting that among the net assets of 366 million men's clothing company listed in the financial report, there is a very peculiar intangible asset subject customer relationship, and its book value has reached 353 million yuan, accounting for 96.4% of the net asset value of men's clothing company.

What is even more fishy is that the asset that Bosteng bought with a huge sum of money has changed the value of the customer relationship loss by 100 million yuan in the earnings report of the year, and explained to this end that the "customer relationship" acquired in May 26, 2009 had a impairment loss.

From May 26, 2009 to March 31, 2010, the actual cash inflow from the relevant distributors and the latest cash inflow from the sub distributors of the group is far below the original level expected by the group on the date of acquisition. "

When the new acquisition is made, it will introduce huge impairment, and the tangible assets are only 13 million yuan. It is very difficult for the men's clothing company to get the purchase price of 658 million yuan.

Just imagine that if Bosideng was the first party to be a related party, it would inevitably have to pass strict auditing and asset appraisal procedures, and large shareholders should avoid voting as related parties. There is no doubt that such an asset acquisition can be recognized by other shareholders.

That is to say, Bosideng adopted a two step paction with ingenious design to turn a single related paction into a non related paction, and in the first announcement, by granting option arrangements, it virtually dispelled the concerns of other shareholders, laying the foundation for the adoption of the plan, thus making the arrangement of the option through the second walk and making use of the huge sum of money to acquire the large shareholder's assets.

According to people familiar with the matter, Fang Shengyi, the 70% pferee of the men's clothing company, declared that although it was an independent third party in the announcement, it was actually a shell company controlled by Gao Dekang.

At the same time, data show that this mysterious Sheng Yi company and Bosideng former owner Hualian holdings are also inextricably linked, or Hualian holdings, the second largest shareholder of Hangzhou Hualian Real Estate Co., Ltd.

Hangzhou Hualian real estate information shows that its controlling shareholder is Hualian Cmi Holdings Ltd, holding 71.98% of its shares; HARVESTFANCYLTD owns 21.41% of its shares; China Hualian Holdings (Hongkong) Holdings Limited owns 6.61% of its shares.

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The 2009-2010 annual report shows that sales of Bosideng reached 5 billion 738 million yuan, an increase of 34.2% over the same period last year, due to the early arrival of winter in 2009/2010.

In this 5 billion 738 million yuan income, the income from men's clothing company contributed 404 million yuan, which is the first time that Boston's annual report has contributed to the income of non feather clothing products.

In the annual report, Bosideng management has also expressed the determination to speed up the four seasons of clothing: "in addition to continuing to invest in Bosteng men's wear, the group will actively seek for non feather garment brand projects with high development potential and good reputation for women's wear, casual wear and children's wear, and expand its brand and product mix through acquisitions, mergers or joint ventures, so as to further enhance the proportion of non feather garment products in the overall sales, so that our high-quality products can serve consumers throughout the year."

And in practical action to implement this strategic thinking, in addition to the establishment of a joint venture with the Rocawear brand in the United States, Bosideng launched a new fashion city style brand BOSIDENGVOGUE in March 2010.

Gao Dekang also told the media that he expected the non down business to be raised to 30% of the company's total profits in 2013.

It is a typical example of China's private enterprises to explore the tortuous experiences of enterprises in different directions. In the future, how to reduce Bosideng's pursuit, create a more favorable growth environment for private enterprises, and promote the adjustment of China's economic structure requires the new wisdom of the government. At the same time, in the pformation of China's economic growth mode, Bosideng is also faced with the test of upgrading and pformation of other industries as well as other private enterprises. For the Gao Dekang who has been immersed in the clothing industry for many years, how to pform the strong brand potential of Bosideng down garment into the brand kinetic energy of every garment subdivision, and thus "step into many different rivers" at the same time, is a new challenge. Gao Dekang spent more than 30 years in repeatedly wearing hat and caps, finishing the first strong brand of Chinese down jacket.