State Owned Enterprise Reform "Game" Situation

The essence of reform is to promote enterprises to adapt to the requirements of market economy.

Redistribution, with the continuous intensification of the consciousness of personal interest and group interest, the relevant stakeholders play a game in the process of adjusting the pattern of interests, so as to maximize the interests of themselves or their own interests.

In the reform of state-owned enterprises, the investors (or the relevant government authorities), the management level and the employees are three important stakeholders.

In the process of enterprise reform, every interest body often has its own special reform plan.

In reality, the adjustment of ownership structure in a pitional economy is essentially a process of public choice.

If we take the reform of state-owned enterprises in the long history of economic development, the reform of state-owned enterprises will, to some extent, be embodied in the spontaneity and non purposeful nature of the process, rather than the wisdom of any individual or group.

Because of the complementarity of the input elements and the checks and balances of power generated by some historical factors, the choice of the reform mode of the state-owned enterprises is interactive. The preference of an interest group to the ownership structure of enterprises can not arbitrarily decide the direction of the reform of state-owned enterprises, and the preferences of other interest groups must be taken into account.

Throughout the reform process of the state-owned enterprises, the game between the three investors, the management level and the employees of the enterprise objectively deduces the mode of the reform of state-owned enterprises in China.

The government led romanticism reform mode.

From the early stage of reform to the middle and late 90s of last century, the initiative of reform at this stage was mainly in the hands of the government (investors). Due to historical factors and the objective social environment at that time, the ability of the managers and employees to play games with the government was very weak.

Therefore, this stage of reform can be called "government led reform". In the face of the situation, the government often set clear goals for reform, and designed and implemented relevant reform measures on a wishful thinking basis.

For instance, at that time, some local governments often hoped that through strong alliance, they would cultivate stars or leading enterprises in the region, or require the dominant enterprises to merge the inferior enterprises, and expect to promote the development of the inferior enterprises. At that time, the government generally hoped to solve the problem of establishing the modern system through the pformation of state-owned enterprises shareholding system and listing.

Practice has proved that such a reform is not successful, and has paid a considerable price.

This stage of reform is full of romanticism, which is essentially a rational conceit of the government as a strong social group.

Management led tragic doctrine

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With the deepening of China's marketization process, the influence and infiltration of developed countries' experience, the gradual rise of private enterprises and private entrepreneurs, the important position of enterprise management in the development of enterprises is gradually recognized by the society and even the government.

Moreover, because of the dual characteristics of "officials" and "enterprisers", the managers of state-owned enterprises in China can "find the market and find mayors".

In addition, the government's supervision and restraint on the management level of state-owned enterprises are not enough, resulting in the phenomenon of insider control is quite common.

Coupled with the many limitations of the government led reform, the leading force of reform needs to be pferred objectively.

At this stage, because of the advantage of sufficient information, the management layer has obvious advantages in the interest game.

At the end of the last century and at the beginning of this century, the reform of state-owned enterprises in China mostly belonged to the management oriented reform mode.

In the process of the reform of state-owned enterprises, it is often the responsibility of the management, the supervision and regulation of the government is weak, and the role of the employees can be very limited. Moreover, the government's policies have also given quite a lot of concessions to the management level to acquire state-owned assets.

The reform at this stage has provided a stage for some enterprises that are well versed in "operation". The state-run enterprises have become private owners in a short time, and state assets are being sold half by half and sold in real terms.

In contrast, the legitimate rights and interests of workers can not be guaranteed.

This stage of reform has more or less the traces of "enclosure movement" of state-owned assets.

This stage of reform is full of the color of pathos, which is essentially an amplification of control blindness in the period of economic and social pformation.

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Idealism reform mode led by internal staff and workers.

Since the beginning of the new century, the awareness of workers' rights and fairness have become more and more strong. The concept of a harmonious society and people-oriented has become an important part of the strategy of governing the country and has a rapid impact on the whole society's cognitive system.

As a result, the employees in the enterprise gradually occupy the dominant position in the game of reform. The strong demand for fairness, openness and justice has been supported by the reform policies of state-owned enterprises in recent years, and the workers' right to speak for reform has been maintained, and the legitimate rights and interests of workers have been protected.

Against this background, in recent years, the legal compensation, resettlement of employees, and the shareholding of companies after restructuring have been fully guaranteed.

Because of the large number of staff groups, since the interest demands of this interest body have been strengthened, it will inevitably reflect the value orientation of "everyone's equity" to a certain extent.

Therefore, at this stage of the reform of state-owned enterprises, employees often have relatively large share holdings and even more cases of full shareholding.

There are many boards of directors and management of restructured enterprises, which are directly generated by the universal election of shareholders (essentially employees).

This stage of reform is full of idealism, and in essence is the burst of strength of the former vulnerable groups in the reform.

Today, the era of romanticism reform led by the government has ended, and the reform mode of "enclosure" dominated by management has no soil.

As for the idealism reform led by internal staff, it will inevitably lose its momentum of development because of the high cost and low efficiency of Future Ltd governance.

Moreover, because of the natural exclusiveness of the group, the internal employee led reform still has unfair problems for the whole society, resulting in its weak vitality.

The next reform of state-owned enterprises must involve the whole society. The rational mode of social participation is the only choice after China's SOE reform enters the "deep water area".

However, the reform of state-owned enterprises is an individual based competition or cooperation process, rather than a process of pursuing collective coherence.

Because the main body of social participation is a very broad concept, it is difficult to form a unified interest demand, and because of the asymmetry of information inside and outside the enterprise, it is very difficult for external forces to play a leading role in the game.

This is an important predicament for China to further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises.

From a deeper perspective, the main body of social participation in the reform of state-owned enterprises should be

The important party needs to rely on the modern framework of the economic, legal, political and social security infrastructure.

Only in this way can we truly guarantee the effectiveness, legality, economy and humanistic foundation of the participation of the outside people in the reform of state-owned enterprises.

And the establishment of all this will take longer and require more efforts from the whole society.