China'S Economy Has Increased 6.7% In Three Consecutive Quarters.

The Chinese economy can not make us "cold birds". We should build nests when we are in spring, but not sigh when the weather is cold.

It must be pointed out that although the data is improving, this does not necessarily mean the arrival of the "L" inflection point.

6.7%, this is the three quarter GDP growth announced by the National Bureau of statistics in October 19th.

Obviously, this figure is basically consistent with the expectations of the outside world.

In this way, China's economy has increased by 6.7% in three consecutive quarters, and the goal set at the beginning of this year is a foregone conclusion.

The improvement of data is certainly a good thing. To a certain extent, this shows that China's economy is resilience, its leeway is strong, and there is no need for China's economy to worry too much.

But with the improvement of data, some people believe that the Chinese economy has already completed the bottom line, and the optimistic view that the inflection point of the Chinese economy "L" has arrived is full of media.

The data should be pretty good. In the past three quarters, some important macroeconomic indicators have improved significantly.

For example, PPI has changed from negative to positive after 54 consecutive months, although the growth rate is only 0.1%, but the turnaround time is much ahead of schedule. Private investment increased by 2.5% in September compared with August, and rebounded from August. The import and export data were not as good as expected in September, but the data in the first three quarters have been greatly improved compared with the beginning of the year. Consumption has maintained a two digit growth; fixed asset investment has also started to rebound; the volume of electricity generation and railway freight volume is obviously better than last year.

In May, "authoritative figures" talked about

At present, the cycle is pointed out: "comprehensive judgment, China's economic operation can not be U, not V, but the trend of L.

I want to emphasize that this L type is a stage, not one or two years old.

In the next few years, there is no fundamental change in the pattern of the total demand downturn and overcapacity coexistence. Economic growth can not be as it used to be. Once it rises, it will continue to uplink and continue to achieve several years of high growth.

This seems to be too pertinent now.

There are so many people who are in a state of depression when the data are poor. When the data are good, they can dance to the dance without enough data to see the penetrating power of China's economy and are always controlled by data.

It is easy to say that the inflection point of L has arrived, which does not conform to the basic logic that the Chinese economy will be in the new normal for a long time. It does not meet the calm judgement of the top level that will be in the "L type" for a period of time in China's economy. It also easily interferes with the big theme of supply side reform.

The "L" of China's economy is a judgement about the great cycle of China's economy. This judgment not only refers to the data itself, but also whether there are inherent structural changes in the Chinese economy and the pformation of kinetic energy.

For example, our engine is no problem before, so the economy will fall down, repair the track, and repair other parts. This time, the engine is out of order and the engine must be replaced.

This is not a short-term data solution.

In the past two years, the high level has repeatedly stressed that we must grasp the great logic of the new normal economic development, and unswervingly push forward the structural reform of the supply side. That is to say, China's economy has no way out according to the past mode, and China's economy has entered a truly unmanned area.

The rebound of some data in the first three quarters is gratifying. However, if we observe from the height of the supply side, the improvement of data is only a total consideration, but it does not necessarily mean the optimization of the structure.

Moreover, the rebound of some data has obvious seasonal and short-term factors, and lacks continuity.

For example, some people judged the industrial enterprises to bid farewell to the most difficult stage in August, with the profit growth rate of industrial enterprises in the new year rising. In fact, the high profit growth rate in August was mainly due to the low base last year and the rebound of coal and steel prices this year.

China

The overall difficult situation has not changed. This can be explained from the divergence between the above scale industrial added value and the investment data of manufacturing industry. In August, the industrial added value of above scale was over 6%, but the cumulative growth rate of manufacturing investment in 1 to August was only 2.8%, indicating that the trend of long-term investment in manufacturing industry has not changed.

For example, although PPI was negative before September, it should be seen that the reason leading to PPI's pformation is related to the rebound of coal and steel prices. In the case of excess capacity, the rebound of steel and coal is very difficult to maintain.

Moreover, in September, the medium and long term loans of non-financial enterprises increased by about 400000000000. However, the lack of long-term investment confidence in the short-term deposits has not changed.

There is nothing wrong with confidence in the Chinese economy. But if we put a lot of thoughts on the short-term data to find "bright spots" and judge the Chinese economy from bottom to end or usher in the inflection point, this is actually the least confidence in China's economy. It is the interference and impact of the big theme on the supply side, which seriously affects the long-term expectations of the policy mix formed around the supply side reform.

If we look at the current Chinese economy from the perspective of supply side, though we are going to capacity,

Some progress has been made in major tasks such as going to stock and lowering costs, but there is still a great distance from the supply side.

In particular, the improvement of data this year has a lot to do with the pulling of real estate and infrastructure investment.

In the process, some new contradictions and risk points continue to highlight: first, in the period of going to inventory, the housing prices in some cities are rising rapidly, the contradiction between high inventory and high housing prices is intertwined, the real estate sector is highlighting the risk of leverage, and second, the contradiction between capital and real estate is prominent. In the first three months of this year, loans increased by 10 trillion and 160 billion, of which 4 trillion and 200 billion entered real estate; third, the capacity to make progress in some areas. However, when the price of coal and steel rebounded, new capacity and obstacles were faced. In inventory, deleveraging, etc.

Without resolving these contradictions and risks, it is hard to say that the bottom of the Chinese economy has arrived.

The expectation of policy mix based on supply side reform is the economic thought and policy basis for China's long-term economic development.

During the second half of July, the Politburo meeting also stressed the need for stable macroeconomic policy portfolios.

It is pointed out that "combination policy should be implemented through moderately expanding total demand, unswervingly promoting supply side structural reform and guiding good development expectations."

This is a long-term strategic decision.

In the judgement of economic data, everything must be focused on the policy combination of supply side reform rather than being confused by the value of data.