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Sino Japanese Dispute Over Diaoyu Islands Causes "Textile Problem"

2013/8/14 9:35:00 372

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Sino Japanese Diaoyu Islands Textile Industry Textile Trade Textile Products

The dispute between Japan and China on the issue of Diaoyu Islands is becoming more and more intense. On this issue, the United States has an unshirkable responsibility. P

The policy of the United States on the Diaoyu Islands issue was actually affected by the problem of "a target=" _blank "href=" http://www.91se91.com/ "textile" /a "in the 70s of last century.

When President Nixon made preparations for the election to curry favor with the domestic textile industry, he linked the unrelated issues such as sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, textiles and secrets of Japan and the United States, and the Okinawa issue. This led to the current complex situation, and planted Sino Japanese relations and even the curse of Japan US relations.

since the Noda Kahiko administration nationalized the Senkaku Islands in September last year (that is, my Diaoyu Island and its affiliated Islands), Sino Japanese relations have been in the worst state since the normalization of diplomatic relations 40 years ago.

The fact that the Liberal Democratic Party has been in power for half a year has not shown any signs of improvement.

Important members of the cabinet visited the Yasukuni Shrine, and conservative politicians' untrusting and false statements about historical issues have deepened China's mistrust of Japan, and in the absence of communication, mutual distrust will also create a vicious circle.

beauty promotes Japan Taiwan consultation Diaoyu Island /p >

Under this background, the author has undertaken a job of investigating diplomatic documents concerning the regime of Senkaku Islands in the Okinawa return agreement (signed in June 17, 1971). P

This spring, I was lucky to see an important document.

"P", "when Secretary Rodgers talked with Aichi (foreign minister) in Paris, he talked about this issue, that is, the issue of sovereignty over Senkaku Islands." Rodgers strongly urged the Japanese side and the Taiwan government to have a dialogue on this issue.

As a follow-up, Secretary Rodgers today delivered messages to Aichi's foreign minister in London, emphasizing the urgency and importance of consultations between Japan and Taiwan before the signing of the agreement on the return of Okinawa.

in the instant of seeing this passage, readers should not be too surprised.

This passage comes from a secret document written by Deputy Secretary of state Johnson to the then president, national security affairs assistant Kissinger. This is June 10, 1971, the title of which is "Senkaku Islands".

In countless American government documents, this document is given the highest level of "EYESONLY", that is, only the core decision-makers can read.

Even seeing this declassified document is not easy.

the reason why this top secret is so surprising is simple: today, the issue of Senkaku is the biggest unsolved case between Japan and China and leads to a state of affairs. Taiwan firmly assert its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. The Japanese government considers that "there is no territorial issue".

At that time, the United States, as the leader of Japan US alliance, asked Japan and Taiwan to have a dialogue on sovereignty issues.

Moreover, before the signing of the Okinawa return agreement, that is, before the Senkaku regime will be returned to Japan, the supreme head of the US foreign affairs authorities proposed the request for direct consultation between Japan and Taiwan for the Japanese Foreign Minister.

P, and the time for the US foreign minister to hold talks in Paris is only 8 days before the signing of the Okinawa return agreement, that is, June 9, 1971.

The author of this secret document is Johnson, a senior diplomat of the Japanese school who served as ambassador to Japan in the late 60s. The recipient is Kissinger, who has a great influence on the Nixon administration's foreign and security policy.

That is to say, this is an important document for the core reading of the regime when the Nixon administration decides the US policy toward Japan.

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the secret document also has the following two points:

1. if Japan and Taiwan carry out direct negotiations, it should be based on information pmitted by Ambassador Kennedy and vice president of the Executive Yuan, Kennedy, through the message delivered by Ambassador Kennedy to President Nixon, to make Japan's agreement to participate in Japan Taiwan negotiations as a result of the work of the United States.

2. to Jiang Jingguo, when the signing of the Okinawa return agreement between the United States and Japan, the spokesman of the State Department can make the following statement: "the US government recognizes the dispute between Japan and Taiwan about the sovereignty of Senkaku Islands.

The United States government's return of the regime to Japan does not affect Taiwan's claim, nor does it increase the legal rights of Japan, nor does it harm Taiwan's rights.

now, the Obama administration's formal view is that the Japan US security treaty applies to the Japanese regime, so "Senkaku Islands are also within the scope of security in Japan and the United States".

However, regarding the issue of sovereignty over Senkaku Islands, the United States insists on a neutral stance and considers it a "problem among the parties".

This is the same attitude as successive US governments.

On the issue of Senkaku, the US government recognized Japan's regime and its obligations under the corresponding treaty, but for the sovereignty of Senkaku, the basic attitude of the United States still considered it an "additional problem".

The source of the US P policy should be seen from the top secret document cited above.

In fact, when signing the Okinawa return agreement, the US State Department spokesman issued comments to the media in accordance with Johnson's proposal.

from the first previous contents, we can see that the formation of the US Senkaku policy is closely related to the Nixon administration's most important issue in the field of internal affairs, textiles.

The reason for this is that Ambassador Kennedy is the key figure entrusted by President Nixon for "a href=" http://www.91se91.com/news/index_c.asp "textile > /a".

In response to the massive export of textiles to the United States of Taiwan, South Korea, Hongkong and Japan, he asked these negotiators to implement strict export controls.

November 1969, the head of Japan and the United States held talks in Washington.

This historic meeting decided to return Okinawa under the rule of the United States to Japan and treat it in the same way as the Japanese mainland.

Senkaku Islands, like Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands, were administered by the United States after the signing of the San Francisco peace treaty in 1951.

Regarding the sovereignty of these territories, the United States confirmed Japan's "potential sovereignty".

Although these territories were under the rule of the United States, the United States respected Japan's sovereignty.

Therefore, although the second article of the San Francisco peace treaty stipulates that Japan is committed to abandoning the territory seized and controlled by Japan before the Second World War, such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and Thousand Island archipelago, the legal nature of the Senkaku Islands is obviously different from those of these territories.

In the 1969 meeting, President Nixon reached two secret agreements with Prime Minister Eissaku Sato. P

The first is the so-called "nuclear secret treaty of Okinawa". In Okinawa, the United States reserves more than 120 nuclear warheads at the most. The United States will withdraw these nuclear weapons when returning to Okinawa, but when things happen, Japan will allow the United States to re import nuclear weapons into Okinawa in advance.

Second, as the United States confirms its return to Okinawa in 1972, Japan said it would sign the Japan US textile agreement as soon as possible, and conduct a comprehensive and independent regulation on the issue of textiles exports to the United States.

This is "< a href=" http://www.91se91.com/news/ > Japanese American textiles < /a > secret treaty ".

Popularly speaking, this is the exchange between "rope" and "silk".

Nixon P failed in the general election in 1960.

In the 1968 general election, he promised to mobilize the votes in the south to take the necessary measures to restrict the import of textiles.

In February 1969, shortly after taking office, Nixon decided to consult with the countries concerned to ask the exporters to solve the textile problem in the form of "independent judgment".

To this end, the high priority of textiles in the Nixon administration is also a matter of great concern to Nixon himself.

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has considered shelving the return regime /strong /strong >

because of the textile related issues, shortly before the signing of the Okinawa return agreement, there was a major debate within the Nixon administration about whether to return the Senkaku regime.

I want to briefly introduce this situation in the past.

October 17, 2003, I published a report based on the archives of the National Archives of the United States. The title of the article is "the Nixon administration has refused to return the Senkaku because of textile negotiations." the article reads as follows:

according to the declassified US government archives on the 17 day, during the 1971 textile negotiations between Japan and the United States, Nixon had strongly criticized the uncompromising stance taken by Japan, and discussed the plan of returning the regime to the Senkaku Islands when returning to Okinawa, hoping to achieve the "shock effect on Japan".

before the 1972 general election, the Nixon administration promised to settle the issue of textile negotiations in order to win relevant votes in the domestic textile industry.

This is the first time it has discovered that it intends to use the return of Senkaku as a bargaining chip for Japan.

"P" is different from the current news fever of Senkaku Islands. At that time, this manuscript did not cause any concern.

The manuscript is based on a secret memo written by Pedersen, assistant president of the United States, to Nixon in June 7, 1971.

The memorandum links the original a href= "http://www.91se91.com" > textile problem < /a > with the Senkaku issue, showing the controversy over the formation of the core of the US regime in the return of the Senkaku regime.

Here, I list the main points of the Memorandum:

1. ambassador Kennedy reported that the United States and Taiwan had reached a "preparatory consensus" on Taiwan's 5 years' independent restrictions on textiles in the United States, but there are still heated debates.

Recently, due to the "two Chinas" policy, Taiwan is considered to have been severely hit by the United States.

2. ambassador Kennedy is convinced that the only way to solve the problem is to shelve the return of the Senkaku regime to Japan.

This will save Taiwan's face at home and abroad and help vice president Jiang Jingguo get rid of the political dilemma.

3., Ambassador Kennedy said: "this is not to suggest that the island should be handed over to Taiwan. It would be more sensible to lose Taiwan's face and maintain the status quo than to hand it over to Japan."

Before the signing of the Okinawa return agreement, including the return of the Senkaku regime, "P", the Nixon Administration tried to win the negotiations on Taiwan textiles negotiations.

At that time, the United States and Japan and South Korea were doing the same textile negotiations.

The United States is trying to get Taiwan to accept its own control and take this as a breakthrough, forcing Japan and South Korea to compromise in textile negotiations as soon as possible.

Among them, the Senkaku issue has become a card used by the United States to Japan.

since 1971, Taiwan has sent a message to Secretary Rodgers through the Embassy in the United States: "the Diaoyu Islands have very close ties with Taiwan.

In view of the fact that the United States will end its occupation in 1972, we should respect Taiwan's sovereignty and return the Diaoyu Islands to Taiwan. "

Moreover, the Nixon regime sought to put an end to the Vietnam War as soon as possible, so it needed to be close to the Chinese mainland controlled by the Communist Party so as to change the whole pattern of the cold war. P

Under such circumstances, it is necessary for the United States to adopt a policy of conciliation for Taiwan. Kissinger's policy of "two Chinas" must also be understood by Taiwan.

Therefore, Kennedy in order to complete the textile negotiations as soon as possible, while preserving Taiwan's face, through Pedersen to Nixon proposed "shelving the Senkaku regime".

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finally decided to "handle separately" /p >

In June 7, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the issue and then talked with Pedersen about it. P

I have recorded on the phone with Nixon and Kissinger on the same day. The following are recorded as follows:

Nixon: "what are we facing now? I will go there soon. Is this matter very important?"

Kissinger: "(if shelving the Senkaku regime), it will fail to negotiate with Japan.

Both China and Taiwan think (the senkaka) is part of Taiwan.

If China takes Taiwan, it will be able to get the Senkaku. "

Nixon: "the most important thing is to do something about the textile problem."

Kissinger: "this will pay an unthinkable price in relation to Japan.

The Okinawa return agreement will be signed in another week.

Kennedy (Ambassador) felt that the problem should be raised. "

Nixon: "can this work be done with Pedersen?"

Kissinger: "he is like Kennedy's representative. He should be fine."

Nixon: "I'll see you in five minutes."

before Nixon met, Pedersen and his confidant Kissinger did the above discussion.

It can be seen from the recording that Kissinger opposed the "putting back the regime of the Senkaku". He believed that this would cause an "unimaginable price" for the Japanese relations.

Less than P, what is more interesting is that before accepting Kissinger's proposal, Nixon first said, "the most important thing is to do something about textiles."

In the end, Nixon rejected Pedersen's proposal and Kennedy behind him, and agreed to return to Okinawa and return the Senkaku regime.

but from the recording, we can see that Nixon is more worried about the textile problem.

Even when the Okinawa return agreement is about to be signed, he still wavered in his mind.

In order to win the next year's general election, he hopes to fulfill her promise to the domestic a href= "http://www.91se91.com" and the textile industry < /a >.

Therefore, he was once tempted by the needs of domestic politics and intended to link the issue of the Senkaku and even the Okinawa issue to the textile issue.

finally, the Nixon administration adopted the strategy of separately handling the regime and sovereignty, which was also inherited by the Obama administration.

secret has a profound effect .

precisely because of the textile problem, such a major problem has occurred between Japan and China, and has also had a subtle impact on the relationship between Japan and the United States.

the author interviewed Kuriyama Sanchi, who was the Minister of laws and regulations of the Ministry of foreign affairs in 1971 when he participated in the Paris talks between Japan and the US foreign minister.

But surprisingly, he said he did not remember the question of Senkaku Islands that day.

, however, the Japanese Embassy in France issued a secret telegram on the talks. Rodgers said: "regarding the Senkaku Islands, the state government (Taiwan government - I note) is very worried about the reactions of its ordinary citizens.

On this issue, can the Japanese government take certain measures to help us without hindering the legal position? "

obviously, the problems of Okinawa's return, "a href=" http://www.91se91.com "> Japanese textile" /a "," secret treaty "and" sovereignty over Senkaku Islands "and so on, were not closely related to each other, leaving behind a curse for today's relations between Japan and the United States and Sino Japanese relations.

we can also see that the United States is giving priority to the interests of internal affairs and wisely using diplomatic relations with its allies.

The cost of these secret agreements is that they may cause occasional conflicts due to uninhabited islands and even destroy regional security and strategic stability.