Trade Friction Between Japan And The United States In The Middle And Late Twentieth Century And Its Countermeasures

After World War II, Japan implemented the strategy of "establishing a country by trade".

With the strengthening of economic strength and the expansion of trade export scale, trade frictions between Japan and the United States have escalated.

It can be said that the history of Japanese economic development after World War II is also a history of trade friction, confrontation and negotiation between Japan and the United States.

In line with the upgrading process of Japanese industrial structure

The evolution of trade frictions between Japan and the United States is basically in line with the upgrading process of Japanese industrial structure.

Among them, the textile trade friction occurred earliest and last longest.

In 1955, the United States lowered tariffs on textiles, and a large number of cheap Japanese textiles poured into the United States, which opened the prelude to trade friction between Japan and the United States.

After lengthy negotiations, the two countries signed the Japan US textile agreement and the US Japan textile trade agreement in 1957 and 1972 respectively. In order to ensure the actual benefits in the Japanese American trade, Japan was forced to accept a huge number of voluntary export restrictions.

Since then, along with the upgrading of industrial structure, the composition of Japanese export commodities and the object of trade surplus continue to develop to high value added. The two countries have successively traded on steel (1968 - 1978) and home appliances (1970 - 1980).

After entering the 1980s, Japan's economic strength and industrial competitiveness further enhanced. Technology intensive products such as automobiles (1979 - 1987) and semiconductors (1986 - 1991) once again hit the US market. In the same period, the United States adopted a strong financial and monetary policy of reducing the tax and the dollar, making the domestic financial deficit and trade deficit increasing, and the trade friction between Japan and the United States entered a white hot stage.

In addition to demanding Japan to restrict its entry to the US, the United States also requires Japan to expand imports, lower tariffs and enhance market pparency.

In 1985, the two countries launched "market oriented individual area negotiations" (MOSS) for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, wood, electrical appliances and electrical communications, which are difficult to increase exports to Japan.

However, the negotiations at the industry level did not bring the increase in US exports to Japan. The reason why the United States thought that the Japanese market could not be opened was because of its closed market structure and the escalation of the conflict between the two sides to the macro level.

In 1988, the United States passed the comprehensive trade and competition act, and the super 301 clause was designed to open the Japanese market.

In order to promote Japan's expansion of domestic demand, the Bush administration started the negotiation on the structural barrier agreement between Japan and the United States (SII) from 1989 to 1990, and put forward that Japan should pform from a high saving society to a high consumption society, and strengthen the implementation of the anti-monopoly law.

Under the pressure of the United States, Japan relaxed its control over the financial and securities market and encouraged Japanese enterprises or individuals to invest in the US.

In 1993, the Clinton administration imposed a more severe "result oriented" trade policy on Japan, demanding that Japan set specific "numerical goals" and "objective criteria" in areas such as government procurement, automobiles and spare parts and insurance.

The two countries have carried out a series of tough negotiations around the Japan us comprehensive economic agreement. The tough attitude of the United States towards Japan caused a strong rebound from the Japanese government and the people, and the talks between the two sides broke down in February 1994.

The United States then announced the launch of the "super 301 clause" to implement economic sanctions against Japan and Japan US relations to the bottom.

After that, Japan's Haneda cabinet took a compromise position and reached a bilateral agreement with the United States.

In 1995, after the formal establishment of WTO, the Japanese government intended to get rid of its passive position in bilateral negotiations, refused or delayed the request of bilateral trade negotiations put forward by the United States, and turned to the multilateral trade dispute settlement mechanism to deal with the unilateral act of protectionism in the United States.

In the mid and late 1990s, with Japan's economy in a slump, economic strength and industrial competitiveness declined, trade friction between Japan and the United States gradually entered a calm period.

The serious imbalance between the two countries is a direct cause.

Throughout the trade friction between Japan and the United States, every time the United States first put pressure on the use of strong economic strength and international influence, the number of commodities involved in friction is increasing, and the field is expanding and increasing.

The main reasons include the following three aspects.

First, Japan's high dependence on the US market and the serious imbalance between the two countries are the direct cause.

In 1950, Japan's exports to the United States accounted for 21.9% of Japan's total exports, up to 37.1% in 1985.

Since its first trade surplus with the United States in 1965, its scale has been expanding, reaching the peak of 9 trillion and 369 billion 340 million yen in 1985, accounting for nearly 40% of the US trade deficit.

The United States believes that the huge trade deficit has damaged its own interests.

In March 1985, the US Senate passed a resolution of 92 votes to 0, requesting the president to take retaliatory measures when Japan refused to import more American goods.

In April of the same year, the US House of Representatives passed a similar resolution by 394 votes to 19.

Second, the strategic intent of the us to launch trade frictions is to curb Japan's catching up.

After 1980s, the contrast between economic strength and industrial competitiveness of Japan and the United States changed.

In 1960, Japan's GDP was only 8.2% of that of the United States, accounting for 3.2% of the world's total. In 1988, it rose to 58.5% of the United States, 16% of the world and 24 thousand and 700 of GNI per capita, surpassing the United States.

The US share of world GDP dropped from 39.6% in 1960 to 27.3% in 1988.

Since 1985, Japan has become the world's largest creditor country. By the end of 1990, its net debt was nearly US $450 billion, while the United States became the world's largest debtor country, and net debt reached US $760 billion at the end of 1990.

The economic strength has exacerbated the economic contradictions between the two countries.

In a report published in early 1991, entitled "American public opinion and the US foreign policy of 1991", Japan's economic strength is the primary threat to the United States.

Under such circumstances, the trend of trade protectionism in the US Congress has been strengthened, and trade protectionist legislation and economic sanctions against Japan have been increasing.

Third, consolidating the leading position of the United States in the field of high technology is an important reason for the trade friction between Japan and the United States.

In 1985, Japanese companies surpassed the US for the first time to become the world's largest semiconductor distributor.

In 1986, the market share of Japanese chips exceeded that of the United States, ranking first in the world, and the top three of the world's semiconductor sales were Japanese enterprises.

In the face of the rise of the semiconductor industry in Japan, the United States has adopted more stringent trade protection measures than ever before: dumping investigations on Japanese chip manufacturers, requiring Japan to voluntarily restrict exports, abolishing semiconductor tariffs in an all-round way, opening up the semiconductor market to the United States, and publishing more than 1000 patents on the "super large scale integrated circuit technology research combination", and launching the "301 survey" on the semiconductor industry, forcing Japan to sign the "Japanese American semiconductor guarantee agreement" two times in 1986 and 1991.

In March 1987, the United States also imposed a 100% retaliatory tariff on Japanese computers and color TV products on the basis of "dumping Japan to a third country" and "the United States Semiconductor share has not expanded in the Japanese market". It is the most severe economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Japan over the past 40 years after World War II.

In the second semiconductor agreements signed by Japan and the United States, the market share of us semiconductor products in Japan has been further increased from 10% to 20%.

Through a series of suppression, the United States has successfully consolidated its leading position in the world semiconductor industry.

In 1993, the world semiconductor market in the United States surpassed Japan and returned to the world's first throne.

Avoiding and pferring conflicts by expanding foreign investment

From the initial textile trade friction, Japan has accumulated experience in negotiation and consultation to ease and resolve trade frictions.

For example, learn how to strike a balance between free trade and domestic interests and how to deal with trade frictions.

In the subsequent trade frictions, Japan insisted on making minimal concessions without prejudice to the fundamental interests of the state.

In addition, Japan has taken the following measures to deal with trade frictions between Japan and the United States.

First, expand foreign investment and avoid and pfer conflicts.

Since 1980s, Japan has been able to avoid trade barriers, reduce trade frictions, consolidate and improve the market share of Japanese products through large-scale increase of direct investment in Europe and the United States.

Take the automobile industry as an example, since 1982, TOYOTA, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, MITSUBISHI, Fuji heavy industries and other Japanese auto companies have invested and produced in the US.

This directly led to a decline in the US trade deficit with Japan, thus greatly improving the tense economic and trade relations between the two countries.

In addition, Japan has shifted its relatively inferior industries or processes to Southeast Asia and other regions, making it a product export base for Japan.

The two is to give full play to the management and coordination role of the industry association.

The Federation of economic organizations, the Japan Trade Promotion Council and various trade associations play an irreplaceable role in the management, service, supervision and coordination in obtaining information, providing foreign trade consultation and assisting the government and enterprises in developing and adjusting foreign trade relations and easing foreign trade frictions.

In the car trade friction between Japan and the United States, in the face of the quota restrictions imposed by disorderly exports on the US and Europe, the chamber of Commerce of the Japanese automobile industry coordinated the automatic restriction between the auto manufacturers, and reached a tacit agreement between the enterprises on the number of automobile production and exports.

Three, we should take trade friction as an opportunity to eliminate backward production capacity and achieve industrial upgrading.

Objectively speaking, trade frictions between Japan and the United States have not prevented the development of related industries in Japan.

Industries that are shrinking in trade friction (such as textile industry) are precisely those industries that are relatively inferior and need to be eliminated by industrial upgrading in Japan, and those high-end industries with comparative advantages are not restrained by trade friction.

On the contrary, in order to eliminate trade friction, Japanese companies are forced to invest more in R & D and develop more high-end products.

Japan's automobile and electronics industries have maintained strong trade surpluses in 1990s.

The four is to promote domestic reform and market opening by external pressure.

In addition to the requirements of the United States, the Japanese government also has the desire to promote its own reform.

The cabinet of Nakasone skillfully used the pressure from the United States to maximize political pressure and reduce the resistance of interest groups.

In January 1985, at the summit of the two countries, Japan and the United States jointly launched the opening of the telecommunications industry, eliminating Japan's trade barriers in the telecommunications industry.

In July of that year, Japan also formulated the main framework for improving the market access action plan, and actively promoted market liberalization and liberalization.

It can not be overlooked that, despite the trade friction between Japan and the United States at the industry level, the Japanese side's independent measures to restrict exports, control commodity prices and market share, remove trade barriers and other compromise measures can be temporarily resolved, but ultimately failed to prevent the two countries' trade frictions from escalating to the macro level.

In the Japan US structural barrier agreement signed at the end of 1980s, under pressure from the us to expand domestic demand, Japan promised to invest 430 trillion yen in public utilities in 10 years.

To this end, the Japanese government has borrowed heavily, and inefficient public investment has occupied economic resources, which has greatly hurt the efficiency of macroeconomic operation.

The rapid rise of public debt has also increased the financial burden of the Japanese government and weakened financial sustainability.

Until now, Japan's debt level is still far higher than the average level of developed countries.

(Fang Xiaoxia, Institute of industrial economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)