There Is No Standard Design In Business Mode.

If you want to select the most popular in recent years

When a management concept becomes a fashion, the superstition of it will also arise.

Such assertions as "business model, grasping the spirit", "successful business model replicated can enable enterprises to succeed" and "can design a successful business model through simple principles".

Is this really the case?

Others' success may not necessarily be duplicated.

There is no doubt that good business models can help companies succeed.

But it must be noted that the so-called "good" business model can only be judged at specific times and under specific conditions.

Even if a business model that has been proved successful by other enterprises, if blindly copied without distinction, it may bring bad luck to the enterprise even if the mode of use is stronger and more experienced.

The comparison between Xerox and IBM can give us some inspiration.

In 1950s, there were two kinds of technologies governing the commercial copier market in the United States: light and wet methods and dry heat methods. These two technologies have common defects, such as low Photocopying speed and easy to stain copies.

Against this background, Chester Carlson (Chester Carlson) invented the "Xerox method". Compared with the existing two kinds of photocopying technology, the new technology has faster copying speed and can guarantee the cleaning of the photocopies, so it has great quality advantages.

Carlson took the technology and found the Joe Wilson, President of Haloid company (Xerox Co's predecessor), and the two hit it off.

As a result, the world's first electrostatic copying machine, type 914 photocopier, was born in Haloid.

But the marketing of the 914 photocopier has become a problem.

Because the cost is too high compared with the traditional photocopiers.

At that time, the marketing of commercial copiers basically used the razor blade strategy, which was to be sold separately by photocopiers, while the charges for photocopiers were charged separately.

If 914 is also marketing according to this strategy, the price of photocopiers should be as high as US $2000, which is 6 times more than that of other brands of photocopiers in the same period of 300 dollars.

Obviously, such prices are totally uncompetitive in the market.

Because of this, IBM has predicted that the demand for type 914 photocopiers will not exceed 5000 units.

In order to promote the 914 photocopier, Haloid changed its traditional razor blade sales strategy and began leasing the copier in 1959.

Each consumer can only rent a 914 photocopier for only 95 dollars.

If there are no more than 2000 copies per month, there will be no other cost to pay; if there are more than 2000 copies, 4 cents will be charged for each copy.

This strategy is extremely ridiculous for its peers, because at that time, the photocopying volume of each copier was generally less than 100 copies. According to this quantity, Haloid's pricing strategy is at a loss.

But it proved the vision of Haloid company.

After implementing this strategy of "cheap price and enough volume", 914 has gained rapid popularity.

Because of the superior performance of 914, the copy volume of its users is high. Sometimes even a machine copies more than 2000 copies per day.

The rapid growth of the volume of photocopying has brought Haloid companies a huge profit, making the small company with only 30 million of its assets expand rapidly.

Soon after, Haloid changed its name to Xerox, which opened the prelude to Xerox empire.

With its successful business model, Xerox Empire occupied the entire commercial copier market in the United States, and its rule lasted for more than 10 years.

Xerox gained a substantial return through monopolizing the market.

And such returns are certainly coveted, so competitors appear.

This competitor is none other than IBM.

The blue giant obviously repented his erroneous judgement in the past, and for ten years, he finally began to play with Xerox with his new product.

In many books about business models, in order to highlight the success of Xerox, the fierce market competition has been swept away.

But in fact, this business war itself is a very classic case.

Because the two companies actually used exactly the same business model. Xerox was already the leader of the copier industry, but its strength is still quite different from that of IBM.

However, IBM was defeated in this contest.

Why is that? {page_break}

In 1970, IBM introduced the new product I copier.

Compared with Xerox 914, the Xerox type photocopier, which is dominant in the market, the machine has faster copying speed, higher clarity and unique fire prevention functions.

In order to popularize I photocopier quickly, IBM also introduced copier leasing business.

It needs to be pointed out that IBM is very experienced in machine leasing. In that case, it defeated the competitors in this way, and laid a big role in the commercial computer industry.

When Haloid used the leasing method to promote the 914 photocopier, it took IBM as the reference template. Therefore, this IBM decided to enter the photocopier market by leasing means, and some students mean to hit the students.

Then, how do I make the price of IBM? I found the answer in an old advertisement: the monthly fixed rent of the I copier is 200 dollars, plus 2.3 cents for each copy.

It should be pointed out that although the monthly rental of I photocopiers is relatively high compared with Xerox's similar products, its marginal use cost is much lower.

Because of the huge demand for duplicating users at that time, IBM's pricing strategy is quite tempting.

However, despite the aggressive IBM, the market's reaction to it is very dull.

No matter how hard IBM marketers work hard, the market share of I photocopiers is also hard to improve.

In fact, until the end of the 1980s, IBM had pferred most of its commercial copier business to Kodak and other companies, and its market share was only a fraction of Xerox.

The same business model makes Xerox grow from a small company to a hegemony of the photocopier market, but it can not help the strong IBM to succeed. Why is it? The reason is that the business mode is used differently, and the competitors are also changing.

When the 914 model photocopier came into the market, its competitors were old copiers. The performance of these copiers was much inferior to that of 914, and the selling price was relatively high.

Faced with such an opponent, 914 of the leasing strategy provides consumers with a good chance - they can try new products only by paying a small rental fee.

Because they do not need to buy machines, they will not face any risk cost when trying new products.

Once customers try the 914 copy machine, the obvious difference in performance is enough to convince them to choose the new product.

Plus the previous copier market does not have a particularly prominent brand, so the reputation of 914 is easy to establish.

This is why Xerox first succeeded.

When IBM's I copier entered, its competitor was already the 914 type photocopier in the market.

Although the I duplicator has many advantages over 914, its core technology is "Xerox". The difference between them is not as obvious as that of the old copier. 914.

Because many users have been accustomed to Xerox service, for them, the psychological cost of converting new copiers is very large.

Although the offer offered by IBM is very tempting, it may not be enough to make up for the psychological cost of the customer.

In addition, it is very important that IBM's outstanding performance on other products such as commercial computers may also have a negative impact on it. Seeing IBM, the first reaction of customers is usually "is it not a computer? Is it possible to make photocopiers?" therefore, even if IBM products are really excellent, they will be considered as Shanzhai.

This psychological frame of consumer psychology has also become an important reason for IBM's failure to enter the copier market.

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There is no standard design in business mode.

Some scholars have put forward the design direction of business models, such as from fixed cost structure to convertible structure, from heavy assets to light assets.

Since the simple replication business model is hard to succeed, can we use some established principles to design good business models?

We do not deny that designing business models according to established rules may create some successful enterprises, but we must point out that there are no universally applicable design rules.

If we do not proceed from the analysis of specific circumstances, then the business models designed according to the guidelines will not be viable.

For example, light assets are considered to be a successful business model. Is that so?

In the Hurun retail rich list in 2007, an unfamiliar name - ITAT Group CEO Ou Tong Guo ranked third at 10 billion.

Since the end of the last century, the challenges faced by China's clothing trade have intensified, and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises have turned to domestic trade.

However, they have no brands and channels, nor can they afford admission fees. Therefore, there has been a shortage of sales and overcapacity.

At the same time, after several years of crazy property expansion, a large number of commercial properties have been vacant.

Under such circumstances, Europe and the United States saw business opportunities.

He believes that it is possible to build a trading platform for small and medium-sized enterprises and developers with idle property to make profits: the suppliers (suppliers) are responsible for the supply, and the owners (site providers) are responsible for providing the premises, while they are fully responsible for the management of the shops as a third party.

The three parties share risks and share profits: property owners assume the risk of floating field rent, suppliers take inventory risk and logistics distribution costs, and the third party undertakes promotion costs and wages. After sales revenue is realized, three parties are divided into proportions.

The European Union is very satisfied with its own model and called it the "iron triangle".

It should be said that the "iron triangle" model is not very clever.

On the one hand, its assets can be very light.

It is estimated that the cost of opening a store in accordance with this mode is only about 1 million, so that it can expand explosively in a short time and quickly form a retail chain network covering the whole country, so as to achieve scale advantage.

On the other hand, the risk of most retail formats can be passed on to suppliers and owners.

In addition, the construction of the platform is also in line with the trend of the integration of the industrial chain. Therefore, this model is perfect, no matter what the people are.

This attractive mode was immediately favored by the capital: China United Overseas, Morgan Stanley and Lanshan (China) capital agreed to inject capital.

With the support of capital, ITAT was founded in September 2004.

By 2007, its franchise has reached more than 700, covering more than 270 cities throughout the country, with annual sales of nearly 4 billion and profits exceeding 1 billion.

At that time, the ambition of the European Union is even bigger. He announced that the sales of ITAT will exceed 10 billion in the near future and is actively seeking to go public in Hongkong.

No one expected that such a company regarded as a new star in the industry would become a falling star within a year.

Due to the excessive momentum of ITAT expansion and the need to invest too much money, the risk of fragmentation has occurred in the capital chain.

In this case, the rapid listing has become the only option for ITAT to get out of difficulties.

However, the listing of ITAT was not smooth. In February 2008, the first hearing of ITAT in Hong Kong was rejected.

Subsequently, its listed sponsors Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch have withdrawn from the listing process.

In July, the second round of ITAT hearing was again denied.

After the setback of the listing, the ITAT, which was flourishing for a time, collapsed unexpectedly, and shops in all places closed down one after another.

By April 2009, the flagship store in Shenzhen had also been closed.

The "iron triangle", once regarded as unbreakable, was finally proved to be a vulnerable "mud triangle".

It should be admitted that there are many reasons for the failure of ITAT, such as the motives of the company are not pure, and the management ability is not strong.

But these are not the main reasons for the rapid collapse of ITAT.

In my view, the ITAT's rapid asset collapse has been blamed for its persistent asset pricing model.

It is good to win in light and avoid risks as much as possible, but the principle of economics has told us that such a free lunch does not exist.

What is the price of light assets at the same time of gaining the advantage? The price is the ability to integrate the industry chain.

A company without considerable assets wants to act as an industrial chain integrator and an upstream and downstream enterprise platform. It's like a thin person who wants to be a gangster.

When enterprises operate light assets, the risks of every link in the industrial chain will be magnified.

When assets are "light" to nearly zero, they also lose control of the industrial chain. The risk added to each link in the chain is approaching infinity.

Therefore, any risk can cause a devastating blow to the enterprise.

We are familiar with the success of light asset enterprises, or grasp the core technology necessary for the industry chain, or monopolize important channels, so that they can control the entire industrial chain even with light assets, which are not available in ITAT.

As a matter of fact, because of its low assets, ITAT has failed to establish a more influential clothing brand and has failed to establish a sales channel that is compatible with traditional shopping malls and franchised stores.

In addition, it was too eager to expand, so it laid the foreshadowing for its failure from the beginning.

Interestingly, when light assets seem to be recognized as a trend of development, some of the original light assets enterprises are quietly pforming into heavy assets.

For example, Metersbonwe, which is famous for its virtual operation of light assets, has recently opened many proprietary stores, and its asset reversion trend is emerging.

This trend deserves our consideration.

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Complementarity is most important.

Successful business models are hard to replicate, and good business models do not have simple design principles. So, is the business model without practical value?

In order to give full play to the maximum value of business models, the key lies in complementarity between the various components.

Complementarity means that each element needs to be mutually reinforcing.

A single constituent element, whether it is cost structure, profit model, or the degree of diversification of stakeholders, is not enough to support a successful business model.

Only by properly matching various elements and complementing them fully can the business model play a role.

For example, as mentioned in the previous case, "light assets" is not good or bad in itself. The key is to see the complementarity between asset structure and other characteristics of enterprises.

In addition, as the situation is changing, business models of enterprises should also be changed accordingly.

Therefore, in the process of pformation of business models, we must not only change one aspect, but also comprehensively adjust all elements to ensure the complementarity of them.

Bright Dairy is one of the giants of the national dairy industry.

At first, as a regional brand, the market of Bright Dairy was mainly in East China.

In 1995, Guangming opened the national strategy and determined to realize "a bright country".

Through the strategy of building factories, merging and cooperation, and OEM processing, Guangming has been expanding rapidly in the whole country, leading to the leading position among its peers.

In 2001, Guangming dairy achieved the first sales volume, the first liquid milk market, the first yogurt Market, the first volume of milk collection and the first profitability.

In light of the national expansion strategy, Guangming invited McKinsey to be a strategic adviser in 2001.

McKinsey put forward a "light asset strategy" for Guangming, that is, only a small amount of hard assets investment, focusing on product research and development, sales, service and brand promotion, and making profits through output management, technology and brand.

Bright decision-making level believes that this strategy has successfully solved the bottleneck problem of bright development and accepted it willingly.

However, despite the rapid expansion of light asset strategy, its brand building is not synchronized, nor does it relocate its products according to market demand. Therefore, it has not been able to win enough customers to digest capacity.

The strength of light is low temperature milk, which is very popular in its traditional market, but it is difficult to meet the needs of the newly developed Midwest market.

However, the bright decision-makers insist that low temperature milk is the development direction of dairy products, and refuse to develop the popular Chang Wennai products.

In addition to the rapid expansion, bright management has not kept pace with the management confusion and quality decline everywhere.

According to the financial report, in 2004, Guangming's branches in various areas had already suffered large losses.

And soon after, the light was blown out of the milk scandal and the market credit declined.

At the same time, Mengniu, Erie and other rising stars began to exert their strength.

In 2008, Guangming adjusted the decision-making level. Guo Benheng succeeded Wang Jiafen as the new president of Guangming.

At the beginning of his term, Guo Benheng adjusted the strategy of light focusing on low temperature milk, and changed it to low temperature milk and normal temperature milk.

In 2008, the sales of Guangming dairy at room temperature reached 2 billion 270 million, up 31.4% from the same period last year.

At the same time, Guangming actively promotes differentiated strategy and vigorously develops high-end dairy market which is relatively neglected by peers.

While adjusting the market positioning, Guangming also began to change the "light assets strategy", instead of carrying out the vertical integration of the industry chain, trying to build the "whole industry chain" structure of dairy, animal husbandry, logistics and chain linkage.

It is worth noting that, in order to directly control the production of high-end dairy products, bright and even spend money on large-scale overseas mergers and acquisitions.

It should be said that in the current bright business mode, the complementarity of various elements such as location, capital structure and profit pattern has been greatly improved compared with the previous ones.

It can be expected that the forgotten big brother in the dairy world may return again in the near future.

Therefore, when designing business models, it is meaningless to talk about location alone, talk about capital structure or other elements.

It is even more unwise to hope to copy the business models of successful enterprises.

Only by combining the elements rationally and giving full play to the complementarity between them can we achieve a truly successful business model.