Bosideng "Four Seasons" Difficult To Have More Than 5000 Stores Closed This Year

For this objective and beautiful description, people see another annotation: in 2013, Bosideng closed more than 3000 stores, and closed more than 5000 in 2015. Liang Xuhui, chief executive of the "four seasons" executive, left office and was rejected by independent directors of Japan's cooperation with itoin.

Boston: the winter is coming.

The decline of down garment business and the development of men's and women's clothing business were blocked.

Brands are fading and channels are shrinking.

Bosideng is struggling on the road to pformation.

As of this year, Bosideng has the market share in the down jacket Market for the first time in 19 years.

For this first, Gao Dekang, chairman of Bosideng, is full of contradictions and uneasiness.

Another group of figures is even more worrying: Group sales in 2012 were 9 billion 300 million yuan, 8 billion 200 million yuan in 2013, and 6 billion 293 million yuan in 2014, with an annual average rate of over 12%.

For this embarrassment, Gao Dekang's conclusion is: "the era of cost and resource investment to get huge profits is gone forever. The industrial structure needs to be adjusted, the development needs pformation, and the driving mode needs to be changed."

It is summed up as a pformation from diversification to diversification.

For this objective and beautiful depiction, people saw another annotation: in 2013, Bosideng closed more than 3000 stores and closed more than 5000 in 2015. Liang Xuhui, executive director of the "four seasons", left office and was rejected by the independent director with her Japanese cooperation.

The down market is saturated and business spiral is contracting.

In July 2015, Bosideng announced its performance in 2014, and managed to keep 6 billion 293 million yuan in revenue. The result is already good. If Gao Dekang hadn't realized the danger of relying on the down industry only a few years ago, he had implemented the "four seasons" orientation of the comprehensive clothing service provider, and today, Bosideng probably won't even save 4 billion yuan.

Aging products, losing competitiveness

As of 2015, there were more than 3500 manufacturing plants and nearly more than 100 feather down brands nationwide, and the market was seriously saturated.

The down garment market showed signs of decline: retail sales of duck, Sharon and red bean shopping center fell by 5.15%. After 5 years, the decline rate was over 1.5%, and the top ten of feather down brands did not attack.

Gao Dekang was shocked by the decline of collective life, when Bosideng slipped nearly 15%.

An important reason is that the consumption trend of winter clothing has changed steeply.

Beginning in 2008, Japan and South Korea fashion swept the whole of Asia, consumers pursued Japan and South Korea, the winter fashion became overnight, ha ha RI's three pieces of three pieces of delicate dress.

The Boston production line is still outdated style, bloated, conservative, lack of fashion.

The weather is not so beautiful. From 2009 onwards, the warming of the north and the South and the demand for thermal insulation of the down jacket are reduced.

At the same time, the down jacket Market is also threatened by another trend. The European fur, European leather, velvet, jacquard fabric, leather and wool materials have entered the market in a large scale.

On the other hand, on behalf of the world's most popular brands, LouisVuitton, Dior and Armani have also become the trend of the mainland. The massive expansion of H&M, ZARA and C&A in the mainland has brought more new fabrics and winter clothes to the mainland. All these have made the mainland consumers an eye opener. The down garment market in the mainland has been subjected to historical subversion. This is the trend of the world.

Gao Dekang knows that the tide is irresistible. On the one hand, he directing the R & D team to launch the "autumn down" light down garment, trying to insert new concepts into the old products and extend the sales cycle.

On the other hand, he also realized that relying on the down market is difficult to maintain the position of Bosideng. Under multiple pressures, Bosideng proposed the "four seasons" strategy, which takes down garments as the core, and makes diversified development to men's clothing, women's wear and children's clothing to make up for the lack of single business and disperse the risk of operation.

Domestic demand is sluggish, and channels are speeding up.

The competition environment is changing, but the simple extension mode of garment industry has not changed. Bosideng has chosen extensive expansion, and the store has increased from more than 8300 to more than 13000.

Insufficient consumption led to the backlog of down jacket industry in the mainland.

The stock accounts for a lot of money, so as to clear inventory, Bosideng takes risks, reduces direct business, expands franchises, allows franchisees 20% to return products, and encourages dealers to open stores in three or four line cities to facilitate inventory digestion.

The rapid expansion of the channel, but the store does not mean that the shipment is fast and the consumption is sluggish. The dealer also has a large backlog. Bosideng has to cancel the return policy. The inventory causes the franchisee capital to be sluggish, and the backlog causes the product to decrease.

Franchisees had to kill the price on a large scale. Sales promotion, discounts and jumping prices rose one after another, causing a low price competition in the industry. The down market environment deteriorated rapidly, and the sales of the down jacket market continued negative growth for 4 consecutive years.

Low price competition has created opportunities for luxury brands. During this period, fast fashion and luxury brands of many varieties, specifications and all-weather services expanded rapidly in the mainland, with a growth rate of over 15%.

In the background of the down market being compressed and the consumption concept changing, Bosideng put forward the strategy of "multi brand", "four seasons" and "internationalization" in March 2009.

Comments: some analysts believe that Bosideng down business has previously focused on "sex price", should be three-dimensional coverage or pfer to high-end, this judgment is not in line with the truth.

Bosideng also tried to rely on three sub brands of Xue Zhong Fei, Bing Jie and Kang Bo in 2009, and implemented high school and low defense to defend fast fashion and luxury brands.

But Bosideng is limited to two aspects: one is the channel, the other is the brand.

Bosten is good at big business super container and City Street store.

At this time, whether fast fashion or luxury brand, either rely on the super large scale store mode, or rely on the first tier city's International Airport, shopping center and other luxury luxury shopping mall channels, Chanel, LV, GUCCI, Dior can sell 30000 yuan, Bosteng sold to 2000 yuan will make consumers feel expensive, obviously they are not a platform level opponent.

Some people also mentioned that it is necessary to focus on deep development and high-end market.

But from the point of view of market and consumer, the market is saturated. The image of Bosideng is deeply rooted. It is not only impossible to intergrate with luxury brands, nor to compete with domestic brands.

Therefore, "four seasons" is a kind of helplessness and inevitable for Bosideng.

The two generation is the leader of the "four seasons".

In 2011, Bosideng sold 8 billion 300 million yuan as a whole, 9 billion 300 million yuan in 2012 and 8 billion 200 million yuan in 2013. The overall downward trend is obvious. It is easy to see that the main brand is in a downward track of inertia, and "four seasons" is an inevitable strategic shift.

The strategy of "four seasons" of Bosideng is basically carried out in two forms: self run and share participation.

But for these brands, there is no average effort.

Fake internationalization, men's clothing pays the price.

In 2005, Bosideng founded its own brand Bosteng men's clothing.

The chairman of Bosteng menswear is Gao Xiaodong, the eldest son of Gao Dekang. The introduction of men's clothing is an important layout of Bosideng's "four seasons". On the other hand, it also provides a training ground for Gao Xiaodong. When he was tallest, he sold the men's clothing sales for 580 million yuan annually.

Perhaps in order to rush to cut with Bosideng brand, Gao Xiaodong first positioned Bosteng menswear as an international brand and started in Britain, claiming to be an international operator.

Including heavy gold, 300 million yuan was set up in the central business district of London to set up an overseas flagship store, a fashion experience shop in New York, and a series of tall brands such as New York fashion week.

Gao Xiaodong hopes to quickly reverse the consumer's brand awareness of Bosideng and promote the sale of Bosteng men's clothing, especially the lucrative business men's wear market.

The flowers should not be spent, but the flowers will not be spent.

Although Bosideng men's clothing has set up nearly 1000 homes in China

The growth rate is 50%.

However, compared with the powerful power, Hai Lan's home and Qipai, they are still too small, and they have more than 3000 outlets.

In Bosideng men's clothes intoxicated with international operations, the domestic traditional men's wear brand has been deeply ploughed in the domestic market, while the power monopoly has reached 50 million yuan in the CCTV advertising, while Hai Lan's home and Qipai are also frequent visitors to CCTV, repeatedly promoting the "men's Wardrobe" and "30 year plate experience" to consumers.

On the contrary, Bosideng Menswear, though smashed a lot of money overseas, did not make a real "explosion" product, and domestic propaganda is not enough, so it has not set up the "international brand" that Gao Xiaodong longs for.

In the eyes of domestic male consumers, Bosideng men's clothing has always been inferior to that of the strong fighter, Hai Lan's home and Qipai, and is always able to get rid of the shadow of the parent company.

The poor sales data of Bosteng menswear in recent years basically announced that Gao Xiaodong's international brand strategy failed.

In 2012, it also relies on the main brand to boost its performance, but it has been weakening after 2012. In 2012, sales of men's clothing were 480 million yuan, down 30% from the same period last year, and forced to close 146 stores.

Then in 2013 and 2014, they fell to 478 million yuan and 276 million yuan respectively, down 42.3%.

The fashion is missing, and the outlook for women's wear is dim.

How about the Boston women's wear?

In September 2009, Bosideng took part in the American street fashion fast fashion brand lkkval; in 2011, Bosideng launched its own fast fashion women's brand Rui Qi, and then gained the three, 56%, 51% and 70% shares of Mogao leisure brand, Jesse women's clothing and Rambo children's clothing through the way of increasing stock and increasing capital.

Speed does not mean success.

The women's wear market is more competitive. There are ONLY, ESPRIT, including clothes, Europe, JEANSWEST and the north and the south.

Rui Qi and Jesse are mainly women aged 25~40, and almost overlap with their competitors. There are benefits between them.

In desperation, Bosideng will locate Rui Qi in the northern market, and Jesse will continue to take advantage of the south before the acquisition, so as to form a brand strategy and break the women's clothing.

Gao Dekang's mission to Rui Qi is to rely on franchisees to open 80 stores in 2 years, but Rui Qi's brand has not been recognized by franchisees. Instead of opening 27 stores in 3 years, he has invested a lot of money.

For this unknown brand, in 2014, Gao Dekang was determined to terminate "Rui Qi" brand operation.

Jesse relied on the acquisition of its own channels to occupy the South market and continue to operate.

At this point,

The main business direction is large storefront, multi product and quick turnover.

The stores of ZARA, H&M and GAP are all above 500 square meters. ZARA can finish the new process from design to onboard in the shortest 7 days, and about 120000 kinds of fashions can be launched in one year. The H&M reaches the same level and needs 12 days.

It is difficult to survive in a crack, and the rhythm of the fast fashion sensitive supply chain makes Jesse look inferior.

While Jesse is mainly based on imitation, new products from design to finalize the cycle over half of the opponent, fast fashion consumption opportunities fleeting, making Bosideng no competitive advantage in the women's clothing market.

By 2014, lkkal casual clothes and Rui Qi women's clothing were all cut down, leaving only three brands of Bosideng men's wear, Jesse's dress and Mogao leisure.

Let us turn back the clock back to 2011, when Gao Dekang once confidently told the media: "within a few years, the proportion of non down products will increase to more than 40%."

The result is disappointing. As of 2015, the total sales volume of Bosteng was 6 billion 293 million yuan, the down duty business was 4 billion 80 million yuan, the non feather down business accounted for 1 billion 11 million yuan, and the non feather down business accounted for only 16% of the total sales in the latest 2014 fiscal year.

It can be seen that Bosideng's "four seasons" is not satisfactory.

Commented: "the four seasons" has a bright future and a rough reality. No matter whether it is men's clothing or the existing Jesse dress and Mogao leisure, they do not have unique advantages in brand and channel.

Brand marketing is an indispensable means of clothing market, but Bosideng's brand investment is mainly in the down industry.

In 2009, Bosideng down business advertising was 220 million yuan, but the non feather down business input was less than 30%.

In addition to the introduction of Lee Hom's endorsement in 2009, men's clothing has no new initiatives.

Jesse's dress and Mogao women's clothing are also cooperative brands, and they seem to be hesitant.

Only in fashion magazines and part of the network, and Rui Qi almost no brand advertising drive, and down the field has been inviting Yang Mi, Li Chen, A Jiao to maintain brand fever.

In the channel, Bosideng wants to save its own capital through the form of franchisees and limit its store area to 60 square meters.

But since 2009,

The trend of fashion is the expansion of women's clothing brands such as AGG and ZARA in China.

Moreover, both fast fashion and luxury brands are mainly based on small amount, fast consumption and high standard shopping enjoyment.

Obviously, Bosideng did not grasp this pulsation and thus lost the opportunity.

The family management is always in a mess.

Boston is almost brought up by Gao Dekang. Family management is a notable feature of Bosideng. Family management has quick decision-making, less interference, quick response and objective advantages.

Among the board members, there are more than a dozen families or relatives who share the same joys and sorrows, and Gao de Kang has been chairman of the board for nearly 30 years.

But when the society develops to the age of "Internet +", the world seems different. One person's wisdom or family wisdom seems to be inadequate. Especially the two generation of Gao Xiaodong, who had been placed with high hopes, has been proven unable to bring Boston back to the sky.

In May 2014, Gao Dekang hired Liang Xuhui, a professional manager with international background, as the chief executive officer of Bosideng. Liang Xuhui had a good chain management background and operation, and was familiar with the fast fashion store mode and channel mode. Therefore, Liang Xuhui came up with a bold reform of Bosideng's rugged management mode, and adjusted the brands with different orientations on the down jacket.

Bosideng and snow flying brand are mainly based on the entity store business. KangBo is the main regional market, while ice cream is the location of young consumer groups, and focuses on online operation.

For the non feather down business, Liang Xuhui launched the pformation of the terminal store, pforming the only more than 20 medium-sized flagship stores in 400~500 square meters into brand collection shops and experiential shops to make up for the shortage of single products.

Liang Xuhui's approach has also been endorsed by most independent shareholders.

However, Bosideng has been in operation for 30 years. It is difficult to turn around. It is difficult to integrate smoothly in the short term. Liang Xuhui can only sort out and adjust it step by step.

But eager Gao Dekang seems to be more eager to see immediate results, and there is no agreement between the two.

In the 2014 fiscal year, Bosideng's revenue was 6 billion 293 million yuan, down 23.6% from the previous year, and its net profit was only 132 million yuan.

Gao Dekang obviously lost patience. Gao Dekang hoped that Liang Xuhui could guarantee a certain result, but Liang Xu Hui obviously did not adapt to this rugged mode of cooperation.

In February 2015, the uncompromising sides had to go their separate ways.

In the first half of 2015, Bosideng's overall performance is still declining.

Commented: the advantages and disadvantages of family entrepreneurship are obvious, passionate, intelligent and effective, but rough and conceited.

The wisdom of outside industry is often a contradictory state of mind, or too high or too high.

On the other hand, on the other hand, under the modern shareholding mode, the Internet based balance and peer to peer management mode has become the mainstream direction. In the past, the mode of decision making relying solely on entrepreneurs has been challenged, and the independent directors have become a new corrective and counterbalance force.